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COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE
CONSUMER “RIGHT TO KNOW”
Jonathan H. Adler*

Compelled commercial speech, including mandatory labeling and the disclosure of
factually true information, should not be seen as a separate category of speech
under the First Amendment. Rather, compelled commercial speech should be
understood as a type of commercial speech and be subject to the same level of
protection as commercial speech generally. Accordingly, commercial speech
compulsions, such as mandatory disclosures and labeling requirements, must be
supported by a substantial government interest under the Central Hudson
framework. The assertion of a consumer “right to know” does not constitute such
an interest and cannot, by itself, justify compelled commercial speech within this
framework. Allowing such a justification for compelled commercial speech would
eviscerate any meaningful First Amendment protection against compelled
commercial speech and threaten core First Amendment values. Such protection
against speech compulsions will neither inhibit government efforts to protect
consumers nor prevent consumers from obtaining information they desire about
products and services. A dynamic market discovery process, with only limited and
targeted government interventions, is a more effective way to serve the consumer
interest in obtaining more complete information about goods and services. Most
existing compelled disclosure requirements are consistent with this approach to
compelled commercial speech, but some new and proposed disclosure
requirements—including those for genetically modified organisms—are likely to
violate the First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
A new type of salmon may soon appear on supermarket shelves, though it
may not be labeled as such.1 This salmon has been genetically engineered to grow
more quickly in captivity than typical farm-raised salmon.2 Although developed in
a lab, and containing genetic material from multiple species, the “AquAdvantage”
salmon will not bear a government-mandated label. 3 The Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) has determined that there is “no biologically relevant
difference” between AquAdvantage salmon and other farmed Atlantic salmon and

1.
See Brendan Borrell, Why Won’t the Government Let You Eat Superfish?,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 22, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/201405-22/aquadvantage-gm-salmon-are-slow-to-win-fda-approval#p3.
2.
Id.; see also Alison L Van Eenennaam & William M. Muir, Transgenic
Salmon: A Final Leap to the Grocery Shelf?, 29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 706, 706 (2011).
3.
The AquAdvantage Salmon contains “a gene encoding Chinook salmon
growth hormone under the control of an antifreeze protein promoter and terminator from
ocean pout.” See Van Eenennaam & Muir, supra note 2, at 706.
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therefore concluded they are just as safe to eat.4 Under FDA policy, this leaves no
basis to mandate disclosure.5
Mandated labels for the AquAdvantage salmon may not just be against
FDA policy—they could run afoul of the First Amendment as well. Product labels
are commercial speech subject to First Amendment protection. 6 While the
constitutional protection of commercial speech is less extensive than what is
provided for core political speech, there are limits to what the government may
compel producers and sellers to disclose directly to consumers.
The government’s ability to force the disclosure of potentially valuable
information at the point of sale is substantial, but it is not without limits.7 Even
where consumers may greatly desire the disclosure of certain information on a
product label or disclaimer, the government may be unable to act. The government

4.
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VETERINARY MEDICINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
BRIEFING
PACKET
AQUADVANTAGE
SALMON
61–62
(2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/
VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224762.pdf; see also Lars Noah, Whatever
Happened to the “Frankenfish”?: The FDA’s Foot-Dragging on Transgenic Salmon, 65 ME.
L. REV. 605 (2013) (discussing FDA review process for the “AquAdvantage” salmon).
5.
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., AQUADVANTAGE SALMON: ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT DRAFT 2–3 (2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/
UCM333102.pdf (concluding that the salmon are safe for consumption and that
environmental, social, economic, and cultural effects do not need to be considered because
AquAdvantage would only produce the salmon outside of the United States; identifies limited
risk of salmon escaping); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BACKGROUND DOCUMENT: PUBLIC HEARING
ON THE LABELING OF FOOD MADE FROM THE AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 4 (2010),
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/
VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/ucm222635.htm (“FDA cannot require labeling
based solely on differences in the production process if the resulting products are not
materially different due solely to the production process”); see also Lyndsey Layton, FDA
Rules Won’t Require Labeling of Genetically Modified Salmon, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2010,
11:20
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/18/
AR2010091803520.html (“The FDA says it cannot require a label on the genetically modified
food once it determines that the altered fish is not “materially” different from other salmon—
something agencies have said is true.”). Although the FDA claims it lacks the authority to
mandate labels for genetically modified salmon, some in Congress have sought to force the
development of such labels through the use of appropriations riders. See Lydia Wheeler,
Advocates Win Labels for GMO 'Frankenfish', HILL (Dec. 16, 2015, 9:11 AM),
http://thehill.com/regulation/pending-regs/263417-spending-bill-directs-fda-to-finalizeguidelines-for-labeling-gmo.
6.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because
money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Speech likewise
is protected even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit . . .” (citation omitted);
see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 476–77 (1995) (subjecting regulation of
product labels to First Amendment scrutiny).
7.
See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001)
(holding the First Amendment may bar the government from forcing companies to support
commercial speech to which they object).
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may compel speech about products or services offered for sale where it has a
sufficient governmental interest, but this requires more than consumer curiosity. 8
Governments at all levels frequently require the disclosure of potentially
relevant information about goods or services offered for sale. 9 Many disclosure
requirements protect consumers from harms of which they are unaware and are
relatively uncontroversial. In recent years, however, governments have imposed
broader disclosure requirements extending beyond product characteristics to
production processes, product history, and even information about the producer or
service provider. Such disclosure requirements, often predicated on an alleged
“consumer right to know,” have prompted legal challenges.10 In just the last two
years, courts have struggled with constitutional challenges to mandatory country-oforigin labels,11 mandatory genetically modified organism (“GMO”) content labels,12
conflict mineral disclosures,13 and labels about the purported health risks posed by
cell phones.14 This has revealed confusion and uncertainty about the extent to which
the First Amendment protects and limits compelled commercial speech.
This Article explores the question of compelled commercial speech in light
of the Supreme Court’s existing First Amendment doctrine. The Court has said
relatively little about the constitutional limits of mandatory labeling requirements,
particularly where such requirements impose an obligation to disclose factually true
information. Such limits are nonetheless discernible within the Court’s commercial
speech jurisprudence and may yield some counterintuitive results in specific
applications. While most existing labeling and disclosure requirements appear to
conform to the limits implicit in the Court’s decisions, there is information about
companies and products that consumers may wish to know that companies cannot
be compelled to disclose in the context of commercial speech consistent with current

8.
See infra Part IV.
9.
See Brian E. Roe et al., The Economics of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Labels,
6 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 407, 409 (2014) (“[P]roduct labeling is an increasingly popular
tool of regulators.”).
10.
See Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 868
(2015) [hereinafter Post, Compelled Commercial Speech] (noting “the growing number of
circuit court decisions that have used the specific doctrine of ‘compelled commercial speech’
to strike down mandatory commercial disclosures”).
11.
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
aff’d en banc 760 F.3d. 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding mandatory country-of-origin
labels for meat products as against First Amendment challenge).
12.
See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d (D. Vt. 2015) (upholding
mandatory genetically engineered content labels as against First Amendment challenge).
13.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding
mandatory “conflict mineral” disclosure violates First Amendment rights of regulated firms),
aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
14.
See CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, No. C-15-2529 CMC,
2016 WL 324283 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (holding that local ordinance requiring disclosure
of alleged radio frequency risks posed by cellular telephones did not violate First
Amendment).
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doctrine.15 While the government retains substantial authority to protect consumers
and advance other interests through regulation of the commercial marketplace, there
are meaningful, if not overly constraining, limits to the government’s ability to force
private producers and sellers to endorse a government-mandated message.
Part I of this Article describes the current state of commercial speech
doctrine. Under the still-extant Central Hudson test, commercial speech receives
somewhat less constitutional protection than core political speech, but it receives
protection nonetheless.16 Part II turns to the question of compelled speech and the
Court’s repeated insistence that speech compulsions receive the same level of
constitutional scrutiny as speech restrictions.
Part III integrates the doctrines from Parts I and II, outlines a compelled
commercial speech doctrine that accounts for existing precedent, and explains how
limited protection against the compulsion of commercial speech can be squared with
commercial speech doctrine more generally. It explains how to reconcile decisions
concerning commercial disclosure of factual information about products and
services, such as Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,17 with the larger body
of the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence. 18
It is commonly argued that there is a consumer “right to know” key facts
about commercially available products beyond product content. 19 Consumers care

15.
The First Amendment does not impose equivalent requirements on disclosures
to government agencies charged with administering related regulatory programs. See infra
Section VII.C.
16.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also infra Part I.
17.
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
18.
Circuit courts have adopted conflicting opinions on the application of
Zauderer. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 524 (D.C. Cir 2015) (noting the
“flux and uncertainty” of the First Amendment doctrine in relation to commercial speech and
the conflict between the circuits regarding the reach of Zauderer”); see, e.g., Am. Meat Inst.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23–28 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Dwyer v. Cappell,
762 F.3d 275, 283–85 (3d Cir. 2014); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States,
674 F.3d 509, 551–69 (6th Cir. 2012); Ent. Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641, 651–53 (7th Cir. 2006); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe,
429 F.3d 294, 308–10, 316 (1st Cir. 2005); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell,
272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001); cf. Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note
10, at 881 (discussing the “tension between Zauderer and Central Hudson”).
19.
See, e.g., Leo Hickman, Consumers Should Have the Right to Know if They
Are
Eating
GM
Food,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
19,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2013/apr/19/gm-food-labelling-consumers
(“Consumers should have the right to know what’s in the food they eat—and know how it
was produced.”); Roger Johnson, Consumers Have a Right to Know Where Their Food Comes
From, HILL, (Aug. 5, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/education/214268-consumers-have-a-right-to-know-where-their-food-comes-from
(supporting country of origin labels); see also Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know
Survive the WTO?: The Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
291, 292 n.3 (2006) (citing examples of groups urging a “consumer right to know”); see
generally Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right-to-Know, 52 FOOD & DRUG
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about the goods they buy—they want to know who produced the goods they
purchase and how those goods were produced. 20 In some cases, consumers care
more about the identity of the producer or how a product was produced than about
the product itself, whether for ethical, ideological, spiritual, or aesthetic reasons. 21
It is unquestionable that such preferences are real, but the consumer desire for
information relevant to such preferences is not, in itself, a sufficiently substantial
interest to justify compelling speech by others.
The idea of a consumer right to know may be appealing, but such an idea
cannot, alone, justify compelled commercial speech. As Part IV explains,
undifferentiated consumer interest or curiosity is more than sufficient to justify
government speech but is not enough to justify mandatory labeling or other
compelled commercial speech. Such a justification for compelled commercial
speech would eviscerate any First Amendment protection against compelled
commercial speech and, given the realities of today’s consumer marketplace,
threaten core First Amendment values.
One potential concern with acknowledging such constraints on the
government’s ability to compel labeling or disclosure is that consumers will be left
unaware about important product and service characteristics that are vital to them.
As Part V explains, such concerns are overstated. Rejecting a consumer right to
know does not entail leaving consumers in the dark about potentially relevant
product and service characteristics. There is a long history of voluntary disclosure
and labeling systems developed in response to consumer demands, including
demands based upon religious, ideological, and other interests.22
Robust protection of commercial speech, and limitations on compelled
commercial speech, will enhance consumer autonomy and facilitate broader
discourse over the political and normative judgments often implicit in personal
consumption choices. The government’s interest in “transparent and efficient
markets” is best served if the government refrains from regulating commercial
speech when it is unable to articulate a substantial interest for doing so.23 A dynamic
market discovery process is a more effective way to fulfill such a value than
mandates based upon a purported consumer right to know.

L.J. 49 (1997); Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know,
39 ECOL. L.Q. 989 (2012).
20.
See, e.g., Douglas B. Holt et al., How Global Brands Compete, 82 HARV. BUS.
REV. 68, 69–72 (2004) (noting that consumers look to brand identification to determine
product quality, social responsibility of the manufacturer, and the cultural ideals associated
with the product).
21.
See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 556 (2004); see
also LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 18–23 (2003); Craig J. Thompson, Understanding Consumption as
Political and Moral Practice, 11 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 139, 141 (2011).
22.
See infra Part V.
23.
Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial
Speech and Coerced Commercial Associations in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 562, 585 (2006) [hereinafter Post, Transparent and Efficient].
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Part VI applies the framework in this Article to three contemporary
compelled speech controversies: (1) mandatory GMO labeling; (2) mandatory
nanotechnology labeling; and (3) country-of-origin labeling. Constitutional
protection for compelled commercial speech makes some proposed disclosure
requirements easier to justify than others, but the results may not always be intuitive.
Part VII then looks at government interventions, short of compelling commercial
speech, that could facilitate greater market transparency and consumer choice.

I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Commercial speech is generally defined as speech which does no more than
propose a commercial transaction or an “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.” 24 In 1975, the Supreme Court, in Bigelow
v. Virginia, first held that commercial speech, such as a paid advertisement in a
newspaper or a product label, “is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely
because it appears in that form.”25 The following year, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court reaffirmed that
commercial speech is protected even if it does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.26 Though the justices have differed on the scope of such protection ever
since, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the constitutional
protection of commercial speech. 27 As the Court explained in United States v.
United Foods, “[t]he fact that the speech is in aid of a commercial purpose does not
deprive respondent of all First Amendment protection.” 28 If anything, the degree of
protection the Court has offered commercial speech has increased in recent years.29
24.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66
(1983) (defining commercial speech as “speech which does no more than propose a
commercial transaction”). While the definition of what constitutes commercial speech may
appear to be straightforward, “[t]he boundaries of the category are . . . quite blurred.” See
Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
Nonetheless, the Court has repeatedly noted a “‘common sense’ distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of speech.” See Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56).
25.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975). The Bigelow Court had noted
the value of commercial speech in earlier cases. Id. (citing Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (“[T]he exchange of information is
as important in the commercial realm as in any other.”)).
26.
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
27.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011); Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2010); Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565–71 (2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United
States, 527 U.S 173, 195–96 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516
(1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
571; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding state prohibition on
attorney advertising violates First Amendment).
28.
533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001).
29.
See, e.g., Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First
Amendment, 193 GEO. L.J. 497, 500 (2015) (noting the Court’s “review of commercial speech
restrictions has gradually become more and more stringent over time”); Post, Transparent
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The Court and commentators have offered various reasons for extending
First Amendment protection to commercial speech. 30 To some, commercial speech
falls within the ambit of the First Amendment not because it serves the interest of
the speaker, but because it serves listeners and society at large.31 Robert Post, for
example, has argued that the value of commercial speech is the “informational
function” it provides.32 Martin Redish extends this argument, noting that the free
flow of commercial information is necessary if an individual is to “achieve the
maximum degree of material satisfaction permitted by [their] resources.”33 As the
Court noted in Virginia State Board, consumers have a “keen” interest in
information about “who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and
at what price,” and such information helps ensure that consumer decisions are
“intelligent and well-informed.” 34 Insofar as accurate commercial information

and Efficient, supra note 23, at 558 n.15 (noting “the Court has continued to apply the
[Central Hudson] test with increasing severity”). This is not a new development. See Rodney
A. Smolla, Afterword: Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate Speech and the
First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1292 (2004) (“Examination of actual case
decisions demonstrates that the trajectory of modern commercial speech law has been an
accelerating rise of protection for advertising.”).
30.
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 652–53 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First
Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 67, 67 (2007) [hereinafter Redish, Commercial Speech]; Martin H. Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 429 (1971) [hereinafter Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace]; Rodney Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993); Daniel E.
Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 88 (1999). Others, of
course, have criticized the Court’s decision to shelter commercial speech under the First
Amendment umbrella. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries,
Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1, 5–6 (1979); see also C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom:
The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2004)
(noting that “our strongest advocates of free speech . . . consistently rejected granting any
protection to commercial speech”) (citation omitted).
31.
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (“A
commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the
seller’s business as because it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of commercial
information.”) (internal citation omitted).
32.
See Post, Transparent and Efficient, supra note 23, at 4 (“Commercial speech
differs from public discourse because it is constitutionally valued merely for the information
it disseminates, rather than for being itself a valuable way of participating in democratic selfdetermination.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment
Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372, 393 (1979).
33.
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, supra note 30, at 433. In
more recent work, Redish goes further and suggests that most arguments in favor of limiting
commercial speech embody a form of viewpoint discriminations. See Redish, Commercial
Speech, supra note 30, at 67.
34.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 762–63 (1976).
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informs consumer decisions, it further serves to enhance market efficiency and
maximize consumer welfare.35
Commercial speech is not only about questions of price and quality,
however. As the Court also noted in Virginia State Board, advertisements and other
commercial speech may also “be of general public interest.”36 As Justice Blackmun
explained, if commercial information “is indispensable to the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.” 37
Knowledge about the prices and characteristics of various goods and services
informs policy preferences. In this way, even commercial speech that is not directly
imbued with normative or political content helps to “enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy.”38
Much commercial speech is imbued with political or other normative
content, making it particularly difficult to exclude advertising and other forms of
commercial speech from constitutional protection. 39 If a major automaker airs a
television advertisement for one of its vehicles in which a consumer criticizes the
federal government’s decision to bail out the automaker’s competitors, is this not
also political speech?40 Or what if a corporation suggests that one reason to purchase

35.
Id. at 764–65 (noting that “the free flow of commercial information” is
“indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system”).
36.
Id. at 764; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (“The
commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum
where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of
slight worth.”).
37.
Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765.
38.
Id.
39.
As the Supreme Court has noted, most speech performs a “dual
communicative function.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); see also Troy, supra
note 30, at 85.
40.
See Paul Bedard, Ford TV Ad Slams Obama Auto Bailouts, U.S. NEWS (Sept.
16,
2011,
9:00
AM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washingtonwhispers/2011/09/16/ford-tv-ad-slams-obama-auto-bailouts. In this ad, which was one of a
series featuring actual Ford customers explaining their decision to purchase Ford vehicles,
“Chris” says:
I wasn't going to buy another car that was bailed out by our government.
I was going to buy from a manufacturer that's standing on their own: win,
lose, or draw. That's what America is about is taking the chance to
succeed and understanding when you fail that you gotta' pick yourself up
and go back to work. Ford is that company for me.
Id. The ad was subsequently pulled due to controversy over its political content. See Jonathan
Oosting, Report: Ford Pulls Bailout Ad After Criticism from Press, Questions from White
House,
MLIVE
(Sept.
27,
2011,
11:24
AM),
http://www.mlive.com/auto/index.ssf/2011/09/report_ford_pulls_bailout_ad_a.html.
In
2012, some consumers also saw politics in a Chrysler Superbowl ad featuring Clint Eastwood.
See Carla Marinucci, Eastwood ‘Halftime in America’ Ad Inspires Debate, S.F. CHRON. (Jan.
30, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Eastwood-halftime-in-America-
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its products or services is its commitment to “fair trade” or a particular vision of
ecological sustainability? 41 Such appeals necessarily rely upon the communication
of implicit political and moral messages that extend well beyond the specific
attributes of a given product or service. For many consumers, consumption decisions
are also imbued with political meaning. The choice of what products to buy and
what labels to display is often politically or ethically motivated.42 Just consider the
individual who buys a Toyota Prius or insists upon shopping at a particular “socially
responsible” store. Such choices may reflect personal preferences, but they also have
an expressive component, much like other forms of protected speech.43 As Martin
Redish notes, “speech concerning commercial products and services can facilitate
private self-government in much the same way that political speech fosters
collective self-government,” and both forms of self-government foster the values of
democracy.44 Commercial speech, and the dialogue it facilitates between consumers

ad-inspires-debate-3229986.php#ixzz1m0KAR5ui; Jeremy W. Peters & Jim Rutenberg,
Republicans See Politics in Chrysler Super Bowl Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A13.
41.
See, e.g., Andrew Adam Newman, This Wake-Up Cup is Fair-Trade Certified,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, at B3 (describing Green Mountain Coffee’s advertising campaign
focusing on their fair-trade coffee); see also Food With Integrity, CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILLE,
http://chipotle.com/food-with-integrity (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (Chipotle’s marketing
campaign claiming that “with every burrito we roll or bowl we fill, we’re working to cultivate
a better world.”). Perhaps ironically, it appears that Chipotle spent more time burnishing its
progressive image than actually ensuring that its food was safe to eat. See Susan Berfeld,
Inside Chipotle’s Contamination Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-chipotle-food-safety-crisis/ (discussing food
poisoning outbreaks at Chipotle). See also infra note 171 and accompanying text.
42.
See, e.g., Lauren Copeland, Value Change and Political Action:
Postmaterialism, Political Consumerism, and Political Participation, 42 AM. POL. RES. 257
(2014) (discussing the rise of “political consumerism” as a form of political participation);
Russell J. Dalton, Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation, 56 POL.
STUDS. 76, 91 (2008); Benjamin J. Newman & Brandon L. Bartels, Politics at the Checkout
Line: Explaining Political Consumerism in the United States, 64 POL. RES. Q. 803 (2011);
Michael Schudson, Citizens, Consumers, and the Good Society, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 236, 239 (2007) (noting consumer choices may be “political in even the most
elevated understandings of the term”); Deitlind Stolle et al., Politics in the Supermarket:
Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 245
(2005) (noting consumer choices as political); see also infra note 172.
43.
See, e.g., Marius K. Luedicke et al., Consumer Identity Work as Moral
Protagonism: How Myth and Ideology Animate a Brand-Mediated Moral Conflict, 36 J.
CONSUMER RES. 1016 (2010); Dhavan V. Shah et al., Political Consumerism: How
Communication and Consumption Orientations Drive ‘Lifestyle Politics,’ 611 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 217 (2007) (discussing “consumer behaviors that are shaped by
a desire to express and support political and ethical perspectives”); Craig J. Thompson et al.,
Emotional Branding and the Strategic Value of the Doppelgänger Brand Image, 70 J. MKTG.
50, 63 (2006) (noting research indicating “consumers’ most valued brands are those whose
symbolic meanings play an important role in their self-conceptions”); Craig J. Thompson &
Zeynep Arsel, The Starbucks Brandscape and Consumers’ (Anticorporate) Experiences of
Globalization, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 631 (2004).
44.
See Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 30, at 81.

2016]

CONSUMER "RIGHT TO KNOW"

431

and producers, also has a dramatic effect on the broader culture.45 As a consequence,
it can be difficult to separate commercial speech from other forms of protected
expression.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
the Supreme Court established a four-part test for government restrictions on
commercial speech. First, in order to qualify for protection, the speech must concern
lawful activity and not be fraudulent or inherently misleading. 46 Second, courts
consider whether the government has asserted a “substantial” governmental interest,
such as preventing consumer deception or protecting public health. 47 Third, if so,
courts consider whether the regulation “directly advances” the government’s
asserted interest and, fourth, whether it is “more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.”48 The government bears the burden of establishing that its regulation
meets these requirements. 49 Though more permissive than those tests the Court
applies to political and other core-protected speech, Central Hudson is “significantly
stricter than the rational basis test.”50
While the Court continues to apply the Central Hudson test, several justices
have signaled their disagreement with it. 51 In recent years the Court has applied
Central Hudson without reaffirming its vitality, often suggesting that commercial
speech should receive greater protection than the Central Hudson test provides.52
Where government regulation does not appear to be viewpoint-neutral or risks
constraining speech on matters of public concern, the alleged commercial context of
such speech has not mattered. As a consequence, Central Hudson provides a floor,
not a ceiling, for commercial speech protection.

45.
See Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 109 NW.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676027.
46.
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 570.
49.
See id. at 564.
50.
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
51.
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517–28 (1996) (Scalia,
J., concurring; Thomas, J., concurring); see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367–68 (2002);
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001) (noting “criticism” of
Central Hudson test by multiple justices); Post, Transparent and Efficient, supra note 23, at
558 n.15 (“More than a majority of the justices have at one time or another indicated their
dissatisfaction with the test.”); David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky
Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2004) (“Since 44 Liquormart, the Court
has made it clear that it would be willing to revisit the doctrine should the appropriate case
come along.”).
52.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–68 (2011).
Although the Court in Sorrell applied traditional Central Hudson scrutiny, it suggested a
willingness to subject government regulation of commercial speech to more exacting scrutiny.
Id.; see also Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell
v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (noting the stringency of Court’s review of restrictions
on commercial speech); Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial Speech
Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 205, 215 (2011) (noting dicta indicating “a
willingness to increase protection for commercial speech”).
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II. COMPELLED SPEECH
The First Amendment applies equally when the government seeks to
compel speech just as much as when it seeks to restrict speech. 53 The right to speak
and the right not to speak are “complementary.” 54 Because the First Amendment, at
its core, protects the “voluntary” expression of ideas, it “necessarily” protects “a
concomitant freedom not to speak publicly.” 55 As the Court explained in Turner
Broadcasting System v. FCC, “At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle
that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence.”56 Forcing an individual to express views
with which they disagree can pose just as great a threat to the free expression of
thoughts and ideas as limitations on speech. Laws that compel speech “pose the
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal,
but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate
through coercion rather than persuasion.” 57 Namely, the time and resources spent
communicating a government-mandated message cannot be devoted to the
communication of the speaker’s preferred message. At the same time, the ability of
listeners to hear—let alone process and actively consider—information and other
messages is limited, 58 so compelling more speech does not always increase
communication or understanding.
The Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing limitations on the
government’s ability to compel speech predate the protection of commercial speech
53.
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410 (“Just as the First Amendment may prevent the
government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the government from
compelling individuals to express certain views.”); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind,
487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988).
54.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“The right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of
‘individual freedom of mind.’”). As the Court in Harper & Row Publishers stated:
[F]reedom of thought and expression “includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” . . . “The essential
thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the
voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to
speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily,
and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak
publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech
in its affirmative aspect.”
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (internal citations
omitted).
55.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)).
56.
512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
57.
Id.
58.
See generally Too Much Information, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18895468 (discussing “information overload”); see also
David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 155, 158, 161 (2006) (noting that listeners have “limited time and cognitive energy”
and that “[a]cquiring and processing new information can be costly”).
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by several decades. In 1943 the Court struck down a state requirement that school
children salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance in public schools. 59 The
First Amendment, the Court explained, protects individuals from “being compelled
to affirm their belief in any governmentally prescribed position or view.” 60 On the
same grounds, the Court held that New Hampshire could not require all car owners
to display the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their license plates.61 As the
Court famously explained in Barnette, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”62
Though recognizing that the state may be able to mandate access to private
property for those with dissenting views, 63 the Court has struck down regulations
forcing companies to distribute the views of groups or organizations with which they
disagree. In Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission of
California, the Court struck down a requirement that a public utility distribute
materials prepared by an external group along with its billing statement. 64 Although
the utility distributed its own newsletter in this fashion, the Court held that the utility
could not be required to enclose additional materials espousing positions with which
it disagreed. It was immaterial that the entity in question was a corporation, and a
publically regulated utility at that. As Justice Powell explained, “Were the
government freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages
with which they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the government could
require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.” 65 Nor did
it matter that the regulation applied to communication accompanying a request for
payment for services rendered.
Just as individuals cannot be compelled to speak messages or espouse
points of view, the First Amendment protects individuals from laws that would
require them to associate with those who espouse objectionable messages or
subsidize directly other speech with which they disagree. 66 Yet the First Amendment
59.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
60.
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
61.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
62.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
63.
See PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 88 (holding that state laws
permitting individuals to exercise free speech and petition at a privately owned shopping
center did not violate the shopping center owner’s rights under the First Amendment).
64.
475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986) (distinguishing this regulation from requirements
that publicly held corporations distribute materials prepared by minority shareholder groups
to shareholders).
65.
Id. at 16.
66.
See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (holding that the
State Bar Association violated the lawyer’s First Amendment rights by collecting dues and
using them to support political campaigns); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 241–42 (1977) (holding that public sector union employees can be compelled
to pay union dues but could not be compelled to subsidize the ideological expression of the
union association).
There is some question whether Abood’s approval of mandatory union dues for public sector
employees has retained its vitality. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); see also
Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 192 L. Ed. 2d 975 (U.S. 2016) (per curiam) (affirming a
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does not prevent the government from using tax dollars to promote or subsidize
government-approved messages.67 Such speech, provided it is clearly paid for and
delivered on behalf of the government, does not raise equivalent First Amendment
concerns. It is one thing for the government to speak its own message,68 but it is
quite another to compel a private individual to mouth the government’s words.

III. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Constitutionally protected freedom of speech includes both commercial
speech and an equal right not to speak. This simple formula would suggest that the
Central Hudson test applies equally to speech limitations and compulsions and, in
particular, that any regulation of commercial speech must serve a substantial state
interest. All of the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases evaluating compelled
commercial speech are consistent with such an approach, as are most federal statutes
and regulations that require disclosure to consumers or other forms of compelled
commercial speech. 69 Yet some courts and commentators have suggested that
compelled commercial speech, and the compelled disclosure of factual information
in particular, should be subject to less demanding scrutiny. 70 The constitutional
protection of commercial speech is itself justified, in large part, on the value of “the
free flow of commercial information” to consumers. 71 This suggests to some that
mandated disclosures may not raise the same degree of First Amendment concerns
as other regulation of commercial speech. 72 This view is mistaken.
Much of the confusion regarding the proper test for compelled commercial
speech stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel,73 in which the Court upheld a requirement that attorneys who
advertise contingent-fee rates must disclose that clients could be liable for court
costs if their suits were unsuccessful. Failure to disclose this information could
mislead some consumers into thinking that a contingent-fee arrangement protected
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision recognizing the sustained validity of
Abood in a 4–4 decision).
67.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005) (holding the
generic advertising of beef by the government, which was funded by beef producers, was
considered “government speech” and therefore not susceptible to a First Amendment
compelled-subsidy challenge).
68.
See infra Section VII.C.
69.
It should be noted that disclosure of information to the government is not
compelled commercial speech and is not, as a general matter, subject to First Amendment
limitations. If the government decides to disclose such information to the public, such
disclosure is government speech and is not subject to First Amendment limitations.
70.
See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir.,
2014) (“We now hold that Zauderer in fact does reach beyond problems of deception,
sufficiently to encompass the disclosure mandates at issue here.”).
71.
See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
72.
See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002)
(describing a labeling requirement as “far less restrictive” than a prohibition on advertising);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980)
(characterizing disclosure requirements as less restrictive than limitations on speech).
73.
471 U.S. at 655–56.
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them against any financial risk of a failed lawsuit when, in fact, they could still be
financially liable for court costs. In upholding the disclosure requirement, the Court
explained a requirement that a seller or service provider disclose factual information
will be upheld so long as the requirement is not unduly burdensome and the
requirement is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers.”74 Further, the Court stated that the “constitutionally protected interest
in not providing any particular factual information in advertising is minimal.” 75
Some courts and commentators have read Zauderer to establish that the
compelled disclosure of factual information is subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny
than is provided by Central Hudson.76 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, for example, held in National Electrical Manufacturers Association v.
Sorrell that such a disclosure requirement “does not offend the important utilitarian
and individual liberty interests that lie at the heart of the First Amendment.” 77 Such
analyses make the mistake of reading Zauderer as providing an alternative test for
compelled commercial speech, as opposed to a relatively straightforward application
of the Central Hudson framework—an application suggested by Central Hudson
itself.78
Under Central Hudson, the state must assert a “substantial interest,” such
as protecting consumers from unwitting harm, in order to justify regulation of
commercial speech. Once this interest has been established, however, courts may
conclude that certain forms of speech regulation, such as mandated disclosures of
supplemental disclaimers, are less burdensome than restrictions or prohibitions on
speech.79 Zauderer is completely consistent with this understanding, and expressly
relied upon Central Hudson to reach its holding.80 It was undisputed in Zauderer
that the disclosure requirement served the substantial state interest in preventing
consumer deception and protecting consumers from unwitting harm—specifically
the undisclosed potential for financial liability for court costs. 81 As the Court held
more recently in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, the “essential
features of the rule at issue in Zauderer” required disclosures “intended to combat
the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements;” only entailed “an
accurate statement” about the nature of what was being advertised; and did not
74.
Id. at 651.
75.
Id. (emphasis in original).
76.
See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 28–30 (Rogers,
J., concurring); Post, Transparent and Efficient, supra note 23, at 560 (Zauderer “advanced
an extraordinarily lenient test for the review of compelled commercial speech.”).
77.
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2001).
78.
Zauderer itself suggests as much. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647
(“[R]estrictions on the use of visual media of expression in advertising must survive scrutiny
under the Central Hudson test.”).
79.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (noting that requiring “limited supplementation” will often constitute a “narrower”—
and therefore more permissible—regulation of commercial speech than a prohibition).
80.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647.
81.
Id. at 653 (“The State’s position that it is deceptive to employ advertising that
refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client’s liability for costs is
reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client’s liability
for costs be disclosed.”).

436

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 58:421

prevent those regulated from “conveying any additional information” about the
services they provide.82
Zauderer, properly understood, is but an application of the underlying
Central Hudson framework to a specific context—one that Central Hudson
expressly contemplated.83 Preventing consumers from being misled by advertising
or other commercial speech is unquestionably a “substantial” state interest under
Central Hudson. Indeed, limits on speech that are inherently or deliberately
misleading need not satisfy Central Hudson’s “substantial interest” requirement at
all for, under Central Hudson, such speech is not protected.84 In most cases, the
means of requiring additional disclaimers or disclosures should serve the
government’s interest in a more narrowly tailored fashion than other regulatory
alternatives. The Court made this very point in Central Hudson. After concluding
that the government had identified energy conservation as a substantial interest that
could justify the regulation of commercial speech, the Court declared that a
mandatory disclosure or qualifying statement would be a less intrusive means of
satisfying the government’s interest than a speech restriction. Nowhere in Central
Hudson, however, did the Court suggest that such a speech requirement could be
justified absent the identification of a substantial interest.
Mandatory disclosures and other types of compelled commercial speech
often constitute a less onerous burden than restrictions or outright prohibitions,
particularly where the state’s interest is in protecting consumers from potentially
misleading communication or from suffering unwitting harms. Where commercial
speech is potentially misleading or even unclear, a requirement of curative counterspeech will typically be preferable to a limitation on speech. As the Court has noted,
where possible, the remedy for potentially misleading speech should be more
speech. 85 Thus, requirements that producers or vendors qualify claims about
products in advertisements and labels are more permissible than limitations or
prohibitions on label or ad claims.
Mandated disclosures may represent a lesser intrusion on protected
interests than direct limitations on speech for several reasons. Insofar as First
Amendment protection of commercial speech is grounded in the consumer interest
in having information upon which to base consumption or other choices, mandated
disclosure or other compelled commercial speech requirements may increase the

82.
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 230–31
(2010).
83.
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27–28 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (suggesting Zauderer can be seen as “an application of Central Hudson”).
84.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (“The government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech
related to illegal activity.”) (citations omitted).
85.
See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142
(1994) (“[D]isclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive
contribution to decsionmaking than is concealment of such information.”); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[I]f there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
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amount of information available to consumers. 86 But, increasing the volume of
information may not always serve the constitutional interest in the “free flow” of
information. Consumers will often benefit from an increase in available information
about products and services, but not always. Due to the problem of “information
overload,” there can be “too much” information as well as too little.87 The optimal
level of information will rarely be complete information. 88 Still, mandating curative
disclosure or a disclaimer is more consistent with First Amendment values than
prohibiting speech outright.89
Second, mandated disclosure, particularly if it takes the form of a warning
or disclaimer to commercial speech, leaves the speaker in greater control of her own
message. Even if potential liability for court costs must be disclosed, as in Zauderer,
the lawyer still gets to tell potential clients that she will take their cases on a
contingent-fee basis. She is simply required to augment her original message with
additional information. If the speaker objects to the mandated disclosure, the speaker
retains the ability to remain silent by opting for another message. A conditional
disclaimer of this sort is dependent on a commercial speaker choosing to
86.
See Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 10, at 877 (“Regulations
that force a speaker to disgorge more information to an audience do not contradict the
constitutional purpose of commercial speech doctrine. They may even enhance it.”).
87.
See, e.g., Svetlana E. Bialkova et al., Standing Out in the Crowd: The Effect
of Information Clutter on Consumer Attention for Front-of-Pack Nutrition Labels, 41 FOOD
POL’Y 65, 69 (2013) (recognizing that increases in information can reduce consumer attention
and discernment); Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER
POL’Y 117, 139 (2001) (noting that increased disclosure requirements can result in less
consumer understanding); Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the Empowered
Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 631 (2014) (“A surfeit of information can overwhelm
consumers, leading them to attend to it selectively or to ignore it altogether.”); Jayson Lusk
& Stephan Marette, Can Labeling and Information Policies Harm Consumers?, 10 J. AGRIC.
& FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1, 1 (2012) (excessive information can reduce consumer welfare);
Wesley A. Magat et al., Consumer Processing of Hazard Warning Information, 1 J. Rɪsᴋ &
Uɴᴄᴇʀᴛᴀɪɴᴛʏ 201, 204 (1988) (“Manufacturers of consumer products are also concerned with
the possibility of information overload because regulatory agencies are requiring them to
include more and more information on labels, a practice they fear will make the labels less
effective as a communication instrument.”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:
Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 Wᴀsʜ. U. L.Q. 417
(2003) (observing that fewer disclosures may better serve consumers due to risk of
information overload); Yvette Salaüna & Karine Flores, Information Quality: Meeting the
Needs of the Consumer, 21 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 21, 23 (2001) (noting that excessive
information can impose costs on consumers); Mario F. Teisl & Brian Roe, The Economics of
Labeling: An Overview of Issues for Health and Environmental Disclosure, 27 AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. REV. 141, 148 (1998) (“[S]imply increasing the amount of information on
a label may actually make any given amount of information harder to extract.”); Weil et al.,
supra note 58, at 158 (noting consumers have “limited time and cognitive energy”).
88.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First
Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. L. REV. 653, 656 (1993) (noting the “optimal level” of information
“is not complete information”); see generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER,
MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 94–106 (2014)
(explaining why mandating disclosure of additional information does not necessarily enhance
consumer welfare).
89.
See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 142.
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communicate a potentially misleading message, and leaves open a near infinite
number of alternative messages for the speaker to make.90
Preventing producers or sellers of goods or services from misleading or
confusing consumers is a substantial interest. As noted above, under the terms of
Central Hudson, if a commercial message is fraudulent or inherently misleading, it
is not subject to any First Amendment protection. 91 On this basis, the state and
federal governments mandate a wide range of disclaimers that qualify the
promotional or other statements made in various industries. Much as attorneys in
Ohio must disclose the potential financial liabilities a plaintiff may incur in
contingent-fee litigation, those who manage and sell various financial services must
explain or qualify information they present to potential consumers. For example, a
mutual fund that displays a graph of its prior performance must disclose that past
performance is not a reliable indication of future performance. 92 Makers of
nutritional supplements who make claims about the potential benefits of their
products must add disclaimers if their claims have not been approved by the FDA.93
The justification for mandatory curative disclosures in these situations is the same
as that for regulations defining terms of art or specifying how producers or sellers
may make certain types of claims in commercial messages. 94 For instance, federal

90.
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[I]n virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we
have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an
advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, ‘[warnings] or [disclaimers] might
be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception.’”) (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 201(1982)).
91.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
92.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(b)(3)(i) (2015); see also Invest Wisely: Advice From
Your
Securities
Industry
Regulators,
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inws.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
93.
See 21 C.F.R. § 101.93 (c) (2015).
94.
See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on the What the Meaning of “False” Is:
Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REV. 227, 240 (2007) [hereinafter Tushnet, It Depends] (noting that “[r]egulation-bydefinition is common”).

2016]

CONSUMER "RIGHT TO KNOW"

439

regulations define the permissible meaning of terms like “fresh,” 95 “natural
flavor,”96 “organic,”97 and “zero calorie.”98
The state’s substantial interest in protecting consumers from unwitting
harm sometimes overlaps with its interest in preventing consumer confusion. That
is, the state has a substantial interest in protecting consumers from harms or
liabilities that could result from the purchase or consumption of a good or service
that poses a threat to an uninformed consumer. For instance, the state has a
substantial interest in requiring producers and sellers of food products to disclose
any potential risks their products may pose to consumers because consumers may
be unaware of such risks otherwise. On this basis, the state may require food
manufacturers to list ingredients and disclose the presence of common allergens,
such as nuts. 99 In such cases, the state is mandating disclosure to prevent an
uninformed consumer from becoming sick (or worse). Whether such disclosures are
wise or necessary in any given instance is a policy question the First Amendment
leaves to the political process. The point is that the state has a substantial interest in
protecting uninformed consumers from the various harms to which they could be
exposed due to information asymmetries. These asymmetries, if left uncorrected,
could result in consumer illness or significant financial loss.
Many, if not most, federal mandatory labeling requirements can be justified
in these terms. Nutritional content mandates, for example, are readily supported by
95.
See 21 C.F.R. § 101.95(a) (2015) (“The term ‘fresh,’ when used on the label
or in labeling of a food in a manner that suggests or implies that the food is unprocessed,
means that the food is in its raw state and has not been frozen or subjected to any form of
thermal processing or any other form of preservation.”).
96.
See 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(3) (2015) (“The term natural flavor or natural
flavoring means the essential oil, oleoresin, essence or extractive, protein hydrolysate,
distillate, or any product of roasting, heating or enzymolysis, which contains the flavoring
constituents derived from a spice, fruit or fruit juice, vegetable or vegetable juice, edible yeast,
herb, bark, bud, root, leaf or similar plant material, meat, seafood, poultry, eggs, dairy
products, or fermentation products thereof, whose significant function in food is flavoring
rather than nutritional.” ). Despite this regulatory standard, there is substantial controversy
over the limits and lack of clarity concerning what the term “natural” signifies on product
lables. See, e.g., Efthimios Parasidis et al., Addressing Consumer Confusion Surrounding
“Natural” Food Claims, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 357 (2015).
97.
See 7 C.F.R. § 205.301 (2015) (describing acceptable terms for product labels
based upon product composition).
98.
See 21 C.F.R. § 101.60(b) (2015). That there are government-approved
definitions does not mean that such regulations eliminate consumer confusion, however.
Under existing regulations, manufacturers may label as “zero calorie” products that have “less
than 5 calories per reference amount customarily consumed and per labeled serving.” As a
consequence, a 20oz. bottle of a Diet Mountain Dew has ten calories, even though PepsiCo
labels 12 oz cans as having zero calories. See The Facts About Your Favorite Beverages: Diet
Mtn
Dew,
PEPSICO,
http://www.pepsicobeveragefacts.com/Home/
product?formula=44316*03*01-01&form=RTD&size=12 (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
99.
See 27 C.F.R. § 5.32a(a) (2015); see generally Scott H. Sicherer et al., US
Prevalence of Self-Reported Peanut, Tree Nut, and Sesame Allergy: 11-Year Follow-Up,
125 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 1322, 1326 (2010) (“[M]ore than 1% of the
population or more than 3 million Americans report peanut allergies, [tree nut] allergies, or
both, representing a significant health burden.”).
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the state’s interest in protecting consumers from unwitting harm.100 Individuals with
special dietary requirements—such as those who need to avoid particular substances
or limit their calorie, fat, or carbohydrate consumption—could be adversely affected
were such information not disclosed on the product label. The same rationale could
apply to requirements that automobile or appliance makers disclose the amount of
energy their products consume, as such requirements inform consumers about the
financial costs of owning and operating such products. 101 In this way, labeling
requirements inform consumers about how specific purchasing decisions will affect
their material interests.102
The same justification would not justify mandated disclosure of
information about which consumers have ethical or religious concerns, but not
because such concerns are unserious or somehow illegitimate. When a diabetic eats
something with more or less sugar than she was aware of, health complications can
result, whether or not she ever becomes aware of the food’s content. There is a
potential for unwitting harm. When an ethical vegetarian consumes a food that,
unbeknownst to her, contains an animal product, there is no harm without disclosure.
The harm, insofar as it occurs, comes from the information that is conveyed. Further,
the harm experienced, while real, is the sort that is generally not accepted as a basis
for limiting speech. Preventing a listener from becoming upset is not a substantial
state interest for First Amendment purposes.103
Many people have strong “preferences for processes,” 104 and care deeply
about product, process, or producer characteristics that have no direct, tangible
effect on their physical or financial well-being.105 Such preferences are legitimate
and affect the utility consumers derive from various products and services. 106
Without question, the disappointment in learning that a product did not conform to
one’s own preferences can reduce a consumer’s utility. Yet, no matter how
100.
See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(a) (2015) (“Nutrition information relating to food shall
be provided for all products intended for human consumption and offered for sale.”).
101.
See 16 C.F.R. § 259.2 (2015) (requiring automobile advertisers to disclose fuel
economy based on certain standards to avoid consumer confusion); 16 C.F.R. § 305.1, 305.3,
305.5, 305.11 (2015) (requiring all consumer appliances to carry a label describing water use,
energy consumption, energy efficiency, energy cost—determined based on standards
established for appliances from refrigerators to lamps); 49 C.F.R. 575.401(a) (2014) (“The
purpose of this section is to aid potential purchasers in the selection of new passenger cars
and light trucks by providing them with information about vehicles’ performance in terms of
fuel economy, greenhouse gas (GHG), and other air pollutant emissions.”).
102.
It is also possible that such disclosure requirements could be justified by other
asserted state interests, such as an interest in energy conservation. See Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980) (holding that energy
conservation is a substantial state interest).
103.
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011) (“Speech remains
protected even when it may . . . ‘inflict great pain.’”) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.
Ct. 1207 (2011)).
104.
See generally Kysar, supra note 21, at 529.
105.
See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
106.
See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 502 (1981) (“Increases in the efficiency of purchase decisions made are
equivalent to increases in real income . . . .”).
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substantial such preferences may be, they are not—and indeed cannot be—a
substantial state interest sufficient to justify the regulation of speech. Any harm the
individual suffers comes from the knowledge that a product’s contents or the manner
in which it was produced did not conform to the individual’s subjective value
preferences.107 The injury would not exist were the information not disclosed. 108
Most existing federal labeling or disclaimer requirements would appear to
conform to Central Hudson’s strictures. Some proposed mandatory labels, such as
those disclosing the use of genetic modification techniques or potentially
controversial production processes, might not. 109 Some other types of disclosures,
like country of origin labeling or environmental ratings, may stand or fall on the
purported justification for such requirements. 110 Because compelled commercial
speech is subject to First Amendment scrutiny, the state must identify a sufficient
interest for any such requirements.
Preventing consumer confusion or protecting consumers from unwitting
harm are not the only potential substantial interests that could justify compelled
commercial speech. Courts have also upheld disclosure or compelled speech
requirements where the speech or message was part of a broader regulatory scheme
of which the compelled disclosure or communication was merely one element. 111
The Supreme Court has used this basis to uphold compelled contributions to
agricultural marketing programs, 112 and lower courts have upheld labeling
requirements designed to facilitate compliance with other state regulations. In
National Electrical Manufacturers Association v. Sorrell, for example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a state’s labeling requirement for
light bulbs containing mercury. 113 The court held that this law facilitated the state’s
efforts to reduce mercury pollution and to ensure the proper disposal and recycling
107.
Insofar as an individual’s preferences are grounded in religious conviction,
there may be “spiritual” harm from consuming a product that was not made in accordance
with one’s religious preferences. However, the protection of such interests is clearly beyond
the scope of the government’s legitimate interests. Indeed, laws designed to protect such
interests could run afoul of the First Amendment prohibition on the establishment of religion.
See, e.g., Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 418–24 (2d Cir.
2002).
108.
More broadly, the First Amendment does not generally recognize the desire to
prevent individuals from being offended or scandalized as a sufficient governmental interest
to justify speech restrictions.
109.
See Thomas A Hemphill & Syagnik Banerjee, Genetically Modified
Organisms and the U.S. Retail Food Labeling Controversy: Consumer Perceptions,
Regulation, and Public Policy, 120 BUS. & SOC. REV. 435, 436 (2015); see also infra Section
VI.A.
110.
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 51–52 (D.C. Cir.,
2014); see also infra Section VI.C.
111.
See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 476–77 (1997)
(upholding compelled assessments on fruit tree growers to support advertising as part of a
larger regulatory marketing scheme). But cf. United States v. United Foods, Inc.,
533 U.S. 405, 415–17 (2001) (invalidating compelled assessments imposed independent of a
broader regulatory scheme).
112.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 476–77.
113.
272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001).
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of mercury-containing products by ensuring that consumers were informed of the
need to dispose of such products in an environmentally safe manner. The purpose of
the requirement was to provide consumers with the information necessary to fulfill
the government’s purpose. 114 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court also
recognized encouraging energy consumption as a substantial interest. 115
Where mandatory labels are permissible, not just any label will do. There
must also be a sufficiently close relationship between the government’s interest,
such as a specific health or safety threat, and the label. 116 Under Central Hudson,
any mandated disclosure must “directly advance” the government’s asserted interest
and not be “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 117 The precise
limits of these prongs of the Central Hudson test lie beyond the scope of this Article,
yet as already noted, simple disclosure requirements that focus on ensuring
consumers have specific types of information generally satisfy these requirements,
provided that a substantial government interest has been identified.

IV. THE CONSUMER “RIGHT TO KNOW”
If commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not fraudulent or
inherently misleading, the government must proffer a substantial interest before it
may regulate such speech by imposing limitations or mandating additional
disclosures or other statements. This creates problems for mandatory labeling or
disclosure requirements premised upon a generic consumer right to know
information that could influence consumer decisions. There is nothing inherently
misleading about failing to disclose every bit of information a consumer might find
to be of interest. Infinite disclosure is neither possible nor desirable. 118 Consumers
may desire all sorts of information about how products were produced or who
produced them. Yet this, by itself, does not constitute a substantial government
interest. Further, allowing the imposition of labeling requirements or other

114.
On the importance of government motivation generally in First Amendment
analysis, see Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
115.
447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980).
116.
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. F.D.A, for example, a divided panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that the FDA failed to put forward
“substantial evidence” that graphic warning labels on cigarette packages “directly advanced”
the government’s interest in reducing the harms to public health from smoking.
696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reached a different conclusion in Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States,
674 F.3d 509, 535–37 (6th Cir. 2012). The FDA subsequently announced it would conduct
additional research to identify what sort of mandatory warning label would best serve the
agency’s interests. See Katy Bachman, Feds Abandon Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels
[Updated], ADWEEK (Mar. 20, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertisingbranding/feds-abandon-graphic-cigarette-warning-labels-148059.
117.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011) (noting the need for a “fit between the legislature’s ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends,” so as to ensure “the State’s interests are proportional
to the resulting burdens placed on speech” (internal quotation omitted)).
118.
See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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disclosures at the point of sale based on nothing more than an asserted consumer
right to know risks compromising other interests protected by the First Amendment.
As noted above, there is a substantial governmental interest in mandating
the disclosure of information to prevent harm to the otherwise uninformed
consumer. Mandatory product labels typically provide unwitting consumers with
information necessary for them to protect themselves from otherwise unknown
product characteristics (as well as to identify and contact the producer). For
example, forcing candy makers to disclose the presence of peanuts protects those
with allergies. Nutritional content labels protect those with particular dietary needs.
Product safety labels can protect those who might be unaware of the danger a
specific product may pose, and so on. In such cases, the failure to label can leave
otherwise uninformed consumers exposed to risks. Protecting consumers from
unwitting harm is a substantial interest comparable to the government’s interest in
protecting consumers from fraud or deception.
There is a substantial governmental interest in protecting the uninformed
or unwitting consumer because such a consumer, by definition, cannot protect
herself in the marketplace. The same cannot be said of the consumer who is aware
of the risks and feels strongly enough to act accordingly. 119 For the informed
consumer, a regime that prohibits false and misleading speech, and otherwise
enables producers to label and promote their products accordingly, is sufficient to
enable the consumer to protect her own interests.120
Insofar as any government has an inherent interest in the safety and
physical well-being of its citizens, such safety is a substantial governmental interest.
Similarly, in a market-oriented society, the government has a substantial interest in
ensuring that all economic transactions are consensual. For this reason, the
government also has a substantial interest in preventing fraud and the exploitation
of unwitting consumers by unscrupulous sellers. Yet there is no clearly substantial
interest in preventing consumers from being upset when they discover something
they do not like about a product or service. Such concerns may be real, but they do
not implicate the same type of governmental interest, particularly in the First
Amendment context.
The claim that consumers have a right to know whatever they believe is
important about a product or the manner in which it was produced cannot be justified
as a substantial government interest. As noted above, such preferences are real, as
many consumers do prefer to purchase goods or services that conform to their
ethical, political, or spiritual beliefs. Aligning their purchasing decisions with their
subjective value preferences maximizes their utility. But forcing others to validate
such preferences is not a substantial government interest. Forcing commercial actors
to speak upon this basis threatens core First Amendment interests. 121

119.
See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 804 (1988) (“[I]t is safer
to assume that the people are smart enough to get the information they need than to assume
that the government is wise or impartial enough to make the judgment for them.”).
120.
See infra Part V.
121.
See infra Section IV.B.
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There are at least four reasons why the assertion of a consumer right to
know, unconnected to a more substantial governmental interest, cannot be sufficient
to compel commercial speech. First, the consumer right to know is a rationale
without discernible limits. If such an interest is a substantial interest then there is,
quite literally, no end to the disclosures that can be mandated. Second, insofar as
most calls for disclosure on the basis of a consumer right to know are based upon
subjective, normative claims, mandating disclosure is not viewpoint-neutral.
Compelling commercial speech on this basis can effectively force producers and
sellers to give voices to perspectives and premises that they do not share, including
politically charged messages about what forms of production or economic
organization are morally, or otherwise, superior. Third, mandating such disclosures
can effectively force producers and sellers to give voice to a politically determined
set of values and to stigmatize their own, otherwise legal products and production
methods. Finally, allowing an alleged consumer right to know facilitates
government intrusion into what are essentially political debates concerning subjects
that lie at the core of First Amendment interests.
A. Lack of Limits
Consumers are potentially interested in a near-infinite range of product and
process characteristics.122 Some might want to know what is in a product; others
might want to know how and by whom it was made. Consider something as simple
as a chicken breast. Some consumers may want to know the nutritional content, and
others may care how the chicken breast was handled or treated—e.g., whether it was
ever frozen or injected with saline. Some care about how the producer treated the
chickens—e.g., whether they were caged or free range, whether antibiotics were
administered—and others care more about the treatment of the workers. Some care
where the chicken was raised or processed—e.g., whether it was locally or
domestically produced—while others would like to know more specifics about the
packaging, and the extent to which it could be recycled. Still others may care about
the company that raised the chicken, whether it is a locally owned farm, a co-op, or
a large corporation, while others may care to know more about the company from
which it would be purchased. Others may be interested in the environmental impact
of raising the chicken—whether there were water pollution concerns or the
production was carbon neutral—while others may like to know what the producer
and seller might do with their profits, whether portions will be given to charity or
invested in environmental initiatives. Some may want to know the political opinions
of the company’s executives or their pattern of political contributions. Others may
wish to know whether a firm funds politically active trade associations and public
interest groups, supports or opposes same-sex marriage, and so on.123
122.
See J. Howard Beales, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern
Biotechnology and the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 109 (2000)
[hereinafter Beales, Modification] (“It is impossible to list all the things that might matter to
everyone.”).
123.
An episode of the cult television program, Portlandia, took this notion to a
potentially absurd extreme by suggesting that some consumers might like to meet the animal
they would consume before ordering it at a restaurant. See Portlandia: Farm (IFC television
broadcast Jan. 21, 2011).
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Consumers are potentially interested in all of the above criteria, and more.
Any of these could be justified by a generic appeal to a consumer’s alleged right to
know. Not only are there consumers who want such information now, there are also
consumers who would come to value such information once it was disclosed on a
regular basis. Consumer preferences for information are not wholly independent of
what is disclosed, as disclosure can increase the salience of the information
disclosed. If a company is required to disclose certain types of information at the
point of sale, this may influence not only consumer decisions, but also the ordering
of a consumer’s preferences for information.
If a generic consumer right to know were sufficient to compel commercial
speech, every potential labeling or disclosure mandate would satisfy this
requirement. The simple existence of such a mandate—the adoption of legislation
or promulgation of a regulation—is itself evidence that some number of consumers
are interested in such information. Otherwise, such a requirement would never be
adopted in the first place. Therefore, any requirement enacted into law or
promulgated by an agency would necessarily satisfy the standard of consumer
interest, and there would be no inherent limit to the sorts of information government
could compel individuals and companies to disclose.
Some may argue that labels should only be required where there is
sufficient consumer interest above some identifiable threshold. Yet, as discussed
below, 124 the stronger the consumer interest in particular information, the more
likely such information will be voluntarily disclosed in the marketplace. Mandatory
disclosure is most necessary in those instances in which voluntary disclosure is not
forthcoming—i.e., in those instances in which the information is least in demand.125
Other than political demand, the state lacks a value-neutral basis upon which to
identify when a consumer right to know is sufficient to justify mandated disclosure
and when it is not.
While the range of potential messages or disclosures that could be justified
under a flexible right to know standard is unlimited, the same cannot be said of the
opportunities a producer or seller has to communicate with potential customers.
Time and space are limited. A seller has only so much time to communicate the
virtues of her product to a potential customer. A product label or advertisement can
only hold so much information.126 Mandating that a producer disclose one set of
information may come at the expense of another set of information more valued by

124.
See infra Part V.
125.
This point highlights the risk of stigma identified below. The reason for
mandating disclosure of characteristics not presently demanded by consumers is often to
make such information more salient in consumer decisions. See infra Section IV.C.
126.
Product manufacturers and retailers may have the ability to place more
detailed product information on company websites, and provide a link or QR code for
interested consumers. Campbell’s, for instance, includes extensive information on product
content at www.whatsinmyfood.com. Among other things, the site details whether specific
products are made with genetically modified ingredients and the purposes that various
additives serve. Providing disclosure on a website, however, does not have the same effect as
mandatory disclosure at the point of sale or on the product label.
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consumers. Further, as discussed above, the consumer’s attention span and
willingness to digest and consider product-related information is limited. 127
Government mandated disclosures or disclaimers compete for scarce space
with the producer’s own message. The more the government requires a seller or
producer to say or disclose, the less ability the seller or producer has to communicate
a message of its own. This means that even if compelled commercial speech does
not implicitly endorse a particular ideological or moral perspective, it still implicates
First Amendment concerns. As the Court noted in Pacific Gas & Electric, one
“danger” of compelled speech is that the regulated entity will have “to alter its own
message as a consequence of the government’s coercive action.” 128 This, itself, is a
basis for “First Amendment solicitude, because the message itself is
protected . . . .”129 At the extreme, the costs of mandated disclosures “may be no
different in practice” than prohibiting the voluntary disclosure of other
information.130
If a lawyer who advertises contingent-fee litigation must also warn
potential clients they may be liable for court costs, that lawyer may avoid making
the disclaimer by choosing another message. A straight labeling or disclosure
requirement does not give the seller or producer the same choice and has a greater
effect on their ability to determine what messages they communicate to consumers,
while also threatening to crowd out those messages which consumers most depend.
In this way, open-ended authority for the government to mandate disclosures would
actually threaten the free and efficient flow of commercial information.
B. Lack of Neutrality
Compelled commercial speech about products and services is often not
viewpoint neutral. This too is constitutionally problematic. Even wholly unprotected

127.
See Weil et al., supra note 58, at 158 (“Because of limited time and cognitive
energy, information users acting rationally to advance their various, usually self-interested,
ends may not seek out all of the information necessary to make optimal decisions.”); see also
supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
128.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986); see also
Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (2014)
(“[C]ompelled speech might actually chill speech.”).
129.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16.
130.
See J. Howard Beales III, Health Related Claims, the Market for Information,
and the First Amendment, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 7, 15 (2011) [hereinafter Beales, Health
Related Claims].
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forms of speech must be regulated in a viewpoint and content-neutral manner. 131
The same is true of commercial speech.132
When the government requires a seller or producer to disclose specific
information about a product or service, the requirement itself communicates a
message. The selection of what information to disclose implicitly confirms that this
information is (or should be) considered relevant to the intended audience.
Mandated nutrition and ingredient labels communicate that there are reasons why at
least some consumers should care about the nutritional content and ingredients of
foods. Where disclosures are based upon a potential health risk, the government
interest is clear: Some consumers risk getting sick if they are not aware of what they
eat. Eliminating that information asymmetry directly advances the government’s
interest in protecting public health. Where such an interest is lacking, however, the
basis for the label is to communicate that this specific characteristic or property is
what individuals should care about.
Without a risk of tangible harm to consumers or a threat to some other
tangible government interest, the basis for requiring disclosure is that particular
information is relevant to those who have a certain set of subjective value
preferences. Such preferences, in turn, are based upon individuals’ moral, political,
ideological, and spiritual commitments. To identify a particular product
characteristic as relevant is to validate the subjective value perspective that identifies
this characteristic as important. A mandate that a producer disclose how a product
was produced, and whether it meets given labor or environmental standards, is to
necessarily presume that meeting such standards is preferable to not meeting such
standards—and that there is something wrong with those who do not comply. While
the government may impose such requirements directly—mandating that producers
meet specified environmental or labor standards in the process of manufacturing
goods—the First Amendment does not allow the government to force individuals to
echo the government’s preference for such policies. That the government may itself
choose sides in such debates, and use government speech to preach the virtues of
“fair” labor conditions or ecological sustainability, does not authorize it to force
private individuals to sing from the same hymnal. In the same vein, the government
may adopt laws or regulations influenced by the religious beliefs of the public, but
it cannot require individuals to espouse those beliefs with their own speech,
commercial or otherwise.
A government mandated label is almost inevitably a warning to a consumer
that highlights the need to consider particular product characteristics and to elevate

131.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see also Rodney A.
Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of
Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 788 (1993) (“The R.A.V. decision stands for the
proposition that even when the government is regulating a class of speech that normally
receives little or no First Amendment protection, the First Amendment’s strict neutrality
standards, which render presumptively unconstitutional discrimination based on content or
viewpoint, still apply with full force.”).
132.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011) (noting
that “commercial speech is no exception” to requirement of heightened scrutiny when
regulation of speech is not content-neutral or viewpoint neutral).
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such characteristics above others, which could just as well have been of consumer
concern.133 This is particularly true given the heuristic devices individuals use to
process information. 134 Consumers rarely have the time or interest to become
experts about every potential product characteristic. Highlighting a particular
characteristic in itself communicates important information, and when that
information is not about an objectively important product characteristic, it
communicates a value and viewpoint-based message about what is important for
consumers to consider. Moreover, by forcing a private party to deliver the
government’s message, the state is able to further “manipulate discourse” by
creating the illusion that a particular concern is “more widespread than it really is”
and by taking advantage of a private speaker’s credibility or trustworthiness. 135
To take an example discussed in more detail below,136 were the government
to require food producers to label foods that might contain GMOs, or other products
of modern biotechnological techniques, it would communicate to consumers that
potential GMO content is something they should care about, even though the federal
government and relevant scientific authorities maintain the use of GMOs in food
production does not alter the content of the resulting food product or raise any
distinct or unique health or safety concerns. That the government selected this
particular characteristic communicates that it is especially relevant to consumer
welfare and is a characteristic that consumers should consider when deciding
whether to purchase a product. The producer is required to give voice to the idea
that a product that may contain GMOs is meaningfully different—normatively if not
physically—than a product that does not, even if the producer does not agree with
the message. In imposing the labeling requirement, the government adopts a specific
viewpoint and then forces the producer to express it.
C. Threat of Stigma
Depending on the content of the compelled commercial speech, it may act
as a warning to consumers. The requirement to disclose becomes a requirement that
a producer or seller potentially stigmatize their own product—to say to consumers
“think about it before you buy this product because of the following fact or
characteristic about which you were previously unaware.” 137 Such a requirement

133.
See Tushnet, It Depends, supra note 94, at 240.
134.
See generally Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information
Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 752 (1980); Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational
Decision-Making in the Human Brain, 313 SCI. 684 (2006); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1130 (1974).
On the effect of cognitive biases on decision-making more generally, see BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
135.
See Corbin, supra note 128, at 1295, 1297.
136.
See infra Section VI.A.
137.
See Lars Noah, Genetic Modification and Food Irradiation: Are Those Strictly
on a Need-to-Know Basis?, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 759, 787 (2014) [hereinafter Noah, Genetic
Modification] (“Demands for disclosure premised on a ‘right to know’ of things that an expert
regulatory agency has judged to be immaterial represent nothing more than efforts to stifle
feared technologies by stigmatizing the resulting products in the marketplace.”).
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effectively forces a producer or seller to testify against its own product and implicitly
endorse the notion that the disclosure of a given fact should be relevant to a
consumer’s decision about whether to purchase the product. Such requirements may
be used to pursue ideological agendas or to place burdens upon competitors. 138
Whatever the purpose, the imposition of a label can have a stigmatizing effect. 139
Consider again the case of GMOs.140 When a producer adorns their product
with a “GMO free” label, they are communicating to consumers that this is a product
characteristic that they believe should influence consumer choices. 141 Such
producers are seeking to encourage consumers to consider this as a relevant factor
in the choice to buy the product, and are doing so not by adopting their own label or
voluntary disclosure, but by requiring other producers and sellers to engage in
potentially stigmatizing speech.142
By the same token, when a product has a “may contain GMOs” or “GMO”
label, such a disclosure communicates that this is a factor consumers should
consider, and may even suggest to some consumers that there is something “wrong”
or unsafe about products bearing such a label. 143 Indeed, this is one reason why antiGMO organizations seek to impose mandatory labeling requirements. 144

138.
See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest
State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 83, 121–25 (1989) (arguing that
the passage of the federal Margarine Tax Act of 1886 was an early example of a lobbying
effort to benefit the dairy industry and destroy the competing product of margarine). Insofar
as the creation of a negative stigma is part of the government’s motive in adopting a
compelled speech requirement, that should also be part of the First Amendment analysis. See
generally Kagan, supra note 114, at 413.
139.
As Lars Noah notes, the adoption of mandatory labels for irradiated foods had
a stigmatizing effect, discouraging the use of a technology and compromising public health.
See Noah, Genetic Modification, supra note 137, at 781–84.
140.
See infra Section VI.A.
141.
See Tushnet, It Depends, supra note 94, at 244–45 (“Labeling may encourage
otherwise uninterested consumers to think, mistakenly, that rBST involves health risks—they
may reason that there would be no label if it didn’t make a difference.”).
142.
See generally Pam Scholder Ellen & Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Stained by the
Label? Stigma and the Case of Genetically Modified Foods, 27 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 69 (2008) (exploring the stigmatizing effects of labeling genetically modified
foods); Editorial, Label Without A Cause, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1169 (2014) (“Labels
are veiled attempts to stigmatize GM food and its producers, based on an ideological
repugnance for genetic engineering.”).
143.
The federal government acknowledged this point in seeking to distinguish the
country-of-origin labels at issue in American Meat Institute, from the rBST labels Vermont
sought to impose on milk producers and retailers in International Dairy Foods Association v.
Amestoy. See Brief for Federal Appellees at 31, Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
746 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5281), 2014 WL 1494240, at *31 (noting such
disclosure could be viewed by consumers “as a concession that the treatment might affect the
quality of the milk”).
144.
Other supporters of mandatory labeling requirements, such as large national
producers, may have other purposes, such as creating a uniform national standard and
preempting variable state standards, or imposing rules that create a competitive advantage or
suppress competition.
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Just because a label or disclosure contains factually true information does
not mean that it is value-free or neutral. Such labels often have the intent and effect
of suggesting that consumers should think twice before purchasing the product.
Indeed, that is the point. Some information-based regulatory tools are explicitly
designed to “shame” companies to change their behavior. 145 A mandatory label for
organic produce that says “Produced with Animal Feces” could be literally true, but
would also stigmatize the products at issue. 146
It is one thing when a seller is required to qualify a claim that it has chosen
to make—e.g., to acknowledge that an implied health benefit is unproven or
unverified, or disclose that a “free” product offer may still obligate the purchaser to
pay processing charges—but quite another to require a disclosure or warning absent
such concerns. Mandatory disclosure of characteristics that some consumers might
perceive as undesirable is particularly likely to pose a risk of stigmatizing a product
when the disclosure is not justified by the need to prevent consumer deception,
clarify or qualify other product claims, or otherwise protect unwitting consumers.
D. Threat to Political Discourse
Some types of compelled disclosure or communication are, for all practical
purposes, requirements that commercial actors communicate value-laden messages
about inherently political questions, such as how products should be made, animals
should be treated, and so on. A requirement that sellers disclose whether the workers
who made a given product are unionized or whether a product is sourced from
countries with “acceptable” political regimes is infused with political content. That
the message accompanies a commercial communication, such as an advertisement
or product label, does not change this fact. 147
Much of what consumers may wish to know about products or services or
the companies that provide such products or services touches on political concerns
and core First Amendment interests. As discussed earlier, many consumers view
marketplace decisions as an extension of their political identities and make

145.
See, e.g., J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
PROJECT ON EMERGING TECHS., EPA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: OVERSIGHT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY
34
(2007),
http://www.nanotechproject.org/file_download/files/
Nano&EPA_PEN9.pdf (discussing value of “public shame” to “discourage bad behavior” in
context of mandatory disclosure laws).
146.
As the popular food chain Chipotle has acknowledged, its decision to source
more ingredients from local and organic sources “make it more difficult to keep quality
consistent, and present additional risk of food-borne illnesses.” See Timothy B. Lee, Local
and Organic Food Has Extra Safety Risks. Just Ask Chipotle, VOX (Dec. 21, 2015, 7:40 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2015/12/21/10641516/local-organic-chipotle-risk. On the potential of
contamination in organic produce, see Avik Mukherjee et al., Preharvest Evaluation of
Coliforms, Escherichia Coli, Salmonella, and Escherichia Coli O157:H7 in Organic and
Conventional Produce Grown by Minnesota Farmers, 67 J. FOOD PROTECTION 894 (2004)
(reporting measurably higher levels of fecal contamination in some organic produce);
Stephanie Strom, Private Analysis Shows a Sharp Increase in the Number of Organic Food
Recalls, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2015, at B3 (noting increase in organic food recalls due to
contamination).
147.
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
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purchasing and consumption decisions based upon political criteria. 148 Those who
care about reproductive rights may have an interest in knowing whether certain
companies donate money to anti-abortion causes. On some college campuses,
activists organized boycotts of Domino’s pizza because of the founder’s support for
anti-abortion organizations.149
Consumer desire for such information would not authorize a government
requirement that companies disclose the politically sensitive donations of their
executives on the products they sell. 150 Supporters of same-sex marriage likewise
sought to boycott Chick-fil-A because the company’s CEO expressed his opposition
to their cause.151 There was also an attempt to boycott Target because it donated to
a gubernatorial candidate who opposed gay rights, even though Target’s donation
was motivated by company management’s interest in other issues. 152 That such
boycotts are permissible does not mean the government can force private firms to
disclose the relevant information in advertisements or on product labels, no matter
how much some consumers desire such information.
Political debate and discourse extends far beyond the ballot box and
reaches into commercial marketplaces. Allowing the government to compel
commercial speech solely because a given political coalition or constituency seeks
such disclosure risks impressing private actors into the service of inherently political
causes. As the Court explained in Pacific Gas & Electric, “Were the government
freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which
they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the government could require
speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.” 153 One way to
address this concern is for the courts to apply greater scrutiny when they conclude
that a given compelled speech requirement is sufficiently political. However, a
cleaner and easier approach—and one that demands less of a complex and
occasionally uncertain doctrine—is simply to require such compulsions be justified
with a substantial governmental interest. This approach is consistent with the
Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence, and provides ample leeway for those
148.
See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
149.
See, e.g., Domino’s, Tower of Pizza Leans Right, 19 OFF OUR BACKS, Apr.
1989, at 7. (report of picketing and boycotts from feminist journal); Siobhan Stiglitz, New
Student Choice Group Calls for Domino’s Boycott, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR, Nov. 2, 1989,
at 1.
150.
Requiring publicly traded corporations disclose such information to
shareholders might raise a different set of issues that lie beyond the scope of this Article.
151.
See Kim Severson, A Chicken Chain’s Corporate Ethos Is Questioned by Gay
Rights Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at A16 (describing how Chick-fil-A supports
anti-gay organizations; causing college students to try to get Chick-fil-A restaurants removed
from campuses).
152.
See Andrea Chang, Target, Gay Rights Supporters at Odds Over How to Settle
Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/08/business/la-fitarget-gay-20110409/2. Perhaps ironically, Target was also the subject of a boycott by the
National Organization for Marriage due to its support for same-sex marriage. See James
Michael Nichols, National Organization for Marriage Announces Target Boycott,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201 4/08/08/nom-targetboycott_n_5661994.html.
153.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).

452

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 58:421

disclosure requirements that are needed to safeguard consumers and facilitate other
important governmental interests.

V. MARKETS WITHOUT MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
Arguments that government regulations should require the disclosure of
particular information about products or services rest on the premise that such
information will not be disclosed—or will not be disclosed sufficiently—absent
such a government requirement. This is the basis upon which it is asserted that the
government has a substantial interest in mandating disclosure or otherwise
compelling speech: Were it not for the requirement, the information would not be
disclosed or otherwise communicated. After all, if the information or message at
issue were already freely communicated without government compulsion, there
would be no need for the government to act. In such a circumstance, it would be
hard to argue the government has any interest at all, let alone a substantial one.
If information that could benefit consumers is not disclosed, however, the
government may have an interest in ensuring disclosure to correct for a potential
market failure.154 The lack of disclosure, it may be argued, results in information
asymmetries that place consumers at the mercy of unscrupulous producers and
sellers. 155 Curing such information asymmetries and ensuring consumers have
access to information that could benefit them and prevent a market failure are
government interests. 156 This may be true if the information in question is not
communicated at all, or if it is not disclosed or communicated to the optimal extent.
Note that where the information disclosure is necessary to prevent harm to
uninformed consumers, such arguments do not assume that no such information is
disclosed, only that some number of uninformed consumers will remain. The
residual risk to an uninformed consumer provides the government with a substantial
interest sufficient to justify regulation under Central Hudson even if there is some
154.
See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 655 (“When information is lacking, there may
well be a conventional case of market failure under economic criteria.”); see also Beales et
al., supra note 106, at 503–09 (discussing information market failures).
155.
See Weil et al., supra note 58, at 156 (noting information asymmetry as
justification for government intervention). For the classic discussion of the problem of
information asymmetry as a source of market failure, see George A. Akerloff, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); see
also Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM.. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). It is worth noting that the “market for
lemons” hypothesized by Akerlof should only arise under a specific set of narrow conditions.
Among other things, if producers are able to communicate quality and other product
information to consumers, the market failure disappears. See Paul H. Rubin, The Economics
of Regulating Deception, 10 CATO J. 667, 674–75 (1991); see also Pauline M. Ippolito,
Consumer Protection Economics: A Selective Survey, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO
CONSUMER PROTECTION ECONOMICS 1, 7 (Pauline M. Ippolito & David T. Scheffman eds.,
1986).
156.
See Golan et al., supra note 87, at 127 (“Labeling decisions may enhance
economic efficiency by helping consumers target expenditures toward products they most
want.”); Teisl & Roe, supra note 87, at 141 (“Simply stated, labeling policies can circumvent
these market inefficiencies by making the information initially held by the firm also available
to the consumer.”).
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voluntary disclosure in the marketplace. There is room to debate whether imposing
a certain quantum of costs on producers in order to implement a disclosure
requirement is worth achieving a certain degree of consumer protection, but that is
a debate for policymakers. If government-mandated disclosure would protect
consumers from unwitting harm, the government has satisfied the substantial
interest requirement of Central Hudson. The more difficult case to make is that the
government retains a substantial interest in compelling information disclosure to
satisfy consumer curiosity or meet the demands of an alleged consumer right to
know, absent any additional claimed government interest.
Manufacturers have substantial economic incentives to provide consumers
with information about their products, as well as to discover what product or process
attributes consumers will find appealing.157 Firms use labels to attract customers, to
differentiate their products from those of their competitors, and to promote the
presence of potentially desirable product characteristics.158 Indeed, in competitive
markets producers have an incentive to disclose any information that is likely to
make their product more desirable to consumers. 159
In competitive markets, the failure to disclose information desired by
consumers can be costly. Consumers generally assume that firms highlight the
positive attributes of their products. As a result, the failure to disclose positive
information creates a negative inference, particularly where competitors highlight
the attribute in question.160 This often creates a dynamic known as “unfolding” or
“competitive disclosure,” as firms face pressure to match the positive claims made
by their competitors.161
If all products in a given market share a negative characteristic, however,
competitive disclosure will only occur if producers of potential substitutes draw
attention to these product attributes.162 This situation is likely to occur with product
categories in which there is a certain degree of uniformity or a basic characteristic
that all must share. It is unlikely that any egg producer is going to advertise or
voluntarily disclose the cholesterol content of eggs. 163 Where products differ within
157.
See Beales et al., supra note 106, at 502 (“[S]ellers have a substantial
economic incentive to disseminate information to consumers.”); Beales, Health Related
Claims, supra note 130, at 9–10 (2011) (“Absent regulatory barriers, sellers will tell
consumers about product attributes that consumers desire.”).
158.
See Golan et al., supra note 87, at 119, 127; see also Beales et al., supra note
106, at 502.
159.
Producers have this incentive so long as the costs of identifying and disclosing
the information are less than the value of the information to consumers. In other words,
producers retain such incentive so long as additional disclosure is efficient. See Beales et al.,
supra note 106, at 502–03.
160.
See Golan et al., supra note 87, at 128.
161.
See Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, The Regulation of Science-Based
Claims in Advertising, 13 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 413, 427–28 (1990).
162.
See Golan et al., supra note 87, at 129.
163.
Though, this creates an incentive for other firms to create a competing
substitute without this negative feature and promote this attribute, as has occurred with egg
substitutes. At the same time, it also creates an incentive to support government restrictions
on product claims so as to reduce competition in that space.
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a given category, comparative marketing is common. If only some products in a
given category contain certain ingredients, and this information is relevant to
consumers, manufacturers have adequate incentive to disclose this information, on
the product label or otherwise. Examples of such voluntary disclosures and
comparative claims are common. The ability to make positive health claims about
their products provides food producers with an incentive to improve the
healthfulness of their products.164 Such claims can also justify price differentials. 165
Producers and sellers voluntarily provide consumers with substantial
information about the virtues of their products.166 Some food producers voluntarily
disclose information that may appeal to some consumers. Some inform potential
consumers about their commitment to humane treatment of animals, while others
trumpet their refusal to use particular chemicals or production processes, or their
commitment to particular charities. Firms that do not ensure that their products are
manufactured in accordance with human rights or social justice concerns may not
voluntarily disclose this fact, but competing firms are not shy about highlighting
their commitment to such concerns. This can be seen by the proliferation of “fair
trade” products and similar efforts to distinguish products on normative grounds.167
Voluntary labeling by some firms raises the salience of the relevant product or
process characteristics and may alter consumer or producer behavior as a result.
Consumers who care about specific product attributes also have a strong
incentive to search out products that satisfy their preferences. Consumers who care
about animal welfare, for example, have every incentive to seek out those products
that satisfy this preference. If a preference is strongly held, consumers are likely to
invest time and effort to satisfy that preference—seeking out undisclosed or veiled
information or identifying proxies for the product or service characteristics that they
desire.168 Consumers do not seek out such information when the cost of obtaining

164.
See Ippolito & Mathios, supra note 161, at 419.
165.
See Beales, Modification, supra note 122, at 111 (“If there are enough
consumers willing to pay to avoid a particular process, or obtain a process they prefer,
manufacturers have every incentive to provide those products.”).
166.
See Paul Milgrom, What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure
in Markets, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 116 (2008) (“In modern economies, sellers routinely
supply helpful information about their products.”).
167.
See Raluca Dragusanu et al., The Economics of Fair Trade, 28 J. Eᴄᴏɴ. Pᴇʀsᴘ.
217, 222 (2014); Corrine Gendron et al., The Institutionalization of Fair Trade: More than
Just a Degraded Form of Social Action, 86 J. Bᴜs. Eᴛʜɪᴄs 63 (2009); Jens Hainmueller et al.,
Consumer Demand for the Fair Trade Label: Evidence from a Multi-Store Field Experiment,
97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 242, 243 (2015); Geoff Moore, The Fair Trade Movement:
Parameters, Issues and Future Research, 53 J. Bᴜs. Eᴛʜɪᴄs 73, 74–75 (2004).
168.
For example, a consumer who wishes to purchase food products that do not
contain the products of genetic engineering may opt to purchase foods with an organic label,
as such foods will also satisfy the consumer’s specific preference. See Jim Chen, Food and
Superfood: Organic Labeling and the Triumph of Gay Science Over Dismal and Natural
Science in Agricultural Policy, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 213, 214–17 (2012) (discussing how organic
label has become a de facto “GMO-free” label). Similarly, consumers who desire products
that meet particular quality or other standards use kosher certification as a proxy for their
concerns. See Eliyahu Safran, You Don’t Have to Be Jewish to Buy Kosher, ORTHODOX UNION
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the information is greater than the value of the information to the consumer, which
indicates the information is costly to obtain or the preference is not particularly
strong.
Consumer preferences change over time, and competitive markets respond
rapidly to such changes.169 Producer decisions about how to advertise or promote
their products contribute to this change, as producers discover latent consumer
preferences and contribute to the evolution of such preferences. 170 Twenty or thirty
years ago, consumers may not have cared how farm animals were treated or whether
certain products were derived from genetically engineered seeds. The decision of a
trendy food outlet to highlight both characteristics not only positions that firm visà-vis its competitors, it also contributes to a broader civic dialogue about what
product characteristics should be important. 171 So, for example, when the popular
restaurant chain Chipotle elected to eschew genetically modified ingredients and
source products from “ethical” sources, and promoted that fact, it prompted broader
public and political debate about the merits of its choices. 172
Even if only a substantial minority of consumers desire information about
how certain types of products are produced, or about specific producer
characteristics, it is likely that more firms will begin to label their products
accordingly. Producers can do this in an unobtrusive way, or take other steps to
communicate with interested consumers. Consider the development of kosher food
labeling. Observant Jews demand food that is prepared in accordance with kosher
laws.173 In response to this demand, many food producers submit their products to a
rabbinical council for evaluation so that they can be certified kosher, and be eligible

(June 7, 2012), http://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/you-dont-have-be-jewish-buy-kosherproducts-eliyahu-safran/.
169.
Beales, Health Related Claims, supra note 130, at 29 (“Markets respond
rapidly to changes in preferences and changes in circumstances.”). The relative speed with
which markets respond to such changes is particularly notable when compared to the relative
speed (or lack thereof) with which government entities and regulatory strictures change. Id.
170.
See Milgrom, supra note 166, at 118 (“An interesting and rarely emphasized
benefit of competition is that competition can be helpful to buyers who are so poorly informed
about a product that they do not even know which product attributes they should care about
and what questions to ask.”).
171.
As Douglas Kysar notes, “when producers make process information available
to consumers for use in their purchasing decisions, the transactions implicate the speech
interests of both producers and consumers—and not merely as speaker and listener, but as
speakers both.” Kysar, supra note 21, at 610.
172.
Chipotle offers explanations for its decisions on its website. See Food With
Integrity, CHIPOTLE, http://www.chipotle.com/food-with-integrity (last visited Mar. 21,
2016). These decisions have prompted debate and pointed responses. See Chipotle: Food with
Hypocrisy, CHUBBY CHIPOTLE, http://www.chubbychipotle.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
This debate intensified after foodborne illness outbreaks at multiple Chipotle locations. See
Timothy B. Lee, Was Chipotle too Busy Avoiding the Fake Dangers of GMOs to Focus on
Actual Food Safety?, VOX (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.vox.com/business-andfinance/2015/12/12/9910642/chipotle-gmo-e-coli; see also Berfeld, supra note 41.
173.
See SUE FISHKOFF, KOSHER NATION 10–15 (2010); Gerald F. Masoudi, Kosher
Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 667, 667 (1993).
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for a voluntary label.174 Even though the demand for kosher foods is only a small
part of the market—and the percentage of consumers who must eat kosher food due
to their religious beliefs is even smaller—many large corporations participate in this
process.175
Voluntary disclosure of product or process characteristics has a long
history. One prominent early example is the National Consumers League (“NCL”)
“White Label” campaign in the early twentieth century. 176 As part of this campaign,
the NCL certified products based upon the labor conditions. Sellers of certified
products, including the prominent retailer Wanamaker, promoted their participation
in the campaign in an effort to gain competitive advantage. Intentionally or not, such
efforts also promoted the underlying cause and helped shape consumer
preferences.177
The development of organic labeling is also instructive. A nontrivial
portion of consumers had a preference for organic products, prompting many
producers to identify their products as organic. 178 This drew consumers away from
“conventional” products toward those with the desired characteristics, even though
certified organic products may have been more expensive.179 Over time, the organic
174.
See Timothy D. Lytton, Kosher Certification as a Model of Private
Regulation, 36 REG. 24, 24–25 (2013); see also Benjamin N. Gutman, Ethical Eating:
Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory Regime to Organic Food, 108 YALE L.J. 2351, 2376
(1999).
175.
See Masoudi, supra note 173, at 667 (noting that only ten percent of Jews
“regularly follow kosher requirements” and yet over 6,000 firms produce kosher products).
176.
See BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BY THE SWEAT
AND TOIL OF CHILDREN (VOLUME IV): CONSUMER LABELS AND CHILD LABOR 7–9 (1997)
[hereinafter SWEAT AND TOIL]; Kathryn Kish Sklar, The Consumers’ White Label Campaign
of the National Consumers’ League, 1898–1918, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17, 17–18 (Susan Strasser et al.
eds., 1998); Kathryn Kish Sklar, Two Political Cultures in the Progressive Era: The National
Consumers’ League and the American Association for Labor Legislation, in U.S. HISTORY AS
WOMEN’S HISTORY: NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 33, 41 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995). For a
more general discussion on the National Consumers’ League, see LANDON R.Y. STORRS,
CIVILIZING CAPITALISM: THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, AND
LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA (2000).
177.
These promotions also likely contributed to popular support for various labor
reforms enacted during this period. See Michele Micheletti, Consumer Choice as Political
Participation, 105 STATSVETENSKAPLIG TIDSKRIFT 218, 220 (2002) (noting the White Label
campaign was “highly successful as an instrument of labor reform” in the early 1900s); see
SWEAT AND TOIL, supra note 176, at 9 (noting NCL ended the White Label campaign after
states began adopting laws with even higher standards for child labor and working
conditions).
178.
See Ram Bezawada & Koen Pauwels, What Is Special About Marketing
Organic Products? How Organic Assortment, Price, and Promotions Drive Retailer
Performance, 77 J. MARKETING 31, 31 (2012); Gary D. Thompson, Consumer Demand for
Organic Foods: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 80 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1113, 1113 (1998).
179.
Meike Janssen & Ulrich Hamm, Product Labelling in the Market for Organic
Food: Consumer Preferences and Willingness-to-Pay for Different Certification Logos,
25 FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 9, 16 (2012).
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share of the market grew. Federal agencies facilitated this process not by mandating
labels, but by issuing labeling guidelines to ensure that label terms would be
commonly understood. The promulgation of such definitions may have actually
enhanced the value of organic labels, as it may have buttressed consumer confidence
by making such labels more trustworthy and reliable.180 Federal agencies or private
third-party organizations could play a similar role to facilitate voluntary labeling of
other product or process characteristics important to consumers, just as they have in
the past. There are already a handful of third-party entities offering or promoting
various environment-related certification and private labeling schemes. 181
Some fear that the absence of official labeling requirements or government
standards defining what label terms mean will undermine consumer confidence. 182
This is a reasonable concern. If consumers lack confidence in a label and cannot be
sure it provides accurate or relevant information, they are unlikely to pay it much
heed. This is true whether the label is mandatory or voluntary. As discussed below,
the adoption of regulatory definitions and standards by regulatory agencies can
address this concern by clarifying what relevant terms mean. 183 Standardizing
terminology in this way can give consumers greater confidence in labels and other
disclosures without inhibiting market efficiency or consumer choice.
The argument that a consumer right to know about particular product or
process characteristics is a substantial government interest is ultimately grounded in
a presumption that such information will only be available to consumers if the
government mandates disclosure. The history of voluntary disclosure in competitive
markets strongly suggests otherwise. If consumers truly desire information about the
products and services they seek to buy, that information will be available. If they do
not, there is only more reason to question whether the government has a substantial
180.
Some argue that the adoption of a federal organic product label had negative
effects on this portion of the market by encouraging standardization, reducing product
differentiation within the organic market, and privileging a definition of what constitutes
“organic” that was preferred by larger food companies. See Michelle T. Friedland, You Call
that Organic?--The USDAs Misleading Food Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379 (2005);
see also Kimberly Kindy & Lyndsey Layton, Integrity of Federal 'Organic' Label
Questioned, WASH. POST (July 3, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/02/AR2009070203365.html. Some pro-organic organizations
consider USDA certified organic products to be merely “grade B” organic products. See
Media Advisory, Organic Consumers Ass’n, “USDA Organic” Is “Grade B” Organic (Oct. 1,
2002),
http://www.organicconsumers.org/old_articles/organic/1002_organic.php.
The
critiques are policy objections to this form of governmental intervention, however, and do not
raise particularly significant First Amendment concerns.
181.
See generally Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions:
Voluntary Standards, Certification and Labeling Systems, 40 ECOL. L.Q. 107 (2013).
182.
See Kim Mannemar Sonderskov & Carsten Daugbjerg, Eco-Labeling, the
State and Consumer Confidence 3, 15 60th Political Studies Association Annual Conference
(Mar. 29–Apr. 1, 2010) (“[T]he extent to which eco-labels increase green consumption is
highly dependent on their trustworthiness . . . . The [study’s] results suggest that governments
who wish to promote green consumerism should engage heavily in eco-labeling. Apparently,
consumers are more likely to trust labeling schemes where the state plays an active and visible
role.”), http://orgprints.org/17151/1/17151.pdf .
183.
See infra Section VII.B.
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interest in disclosure. Again, however, forcing disclosure to protect unwitting
consumers from risks or to facilitate independent regulatory goals may be a
substantial interest, even if satisfying an asserted right to know is not.

VI. APPLICATIONS
Most existing labeling and disclosure requirements satisfy the requirements
of Central Hudson. Of particular relevance to this Article, most existing disclosure
requirements imposed under federal law are justified by a substantial state interest,
such as the protection of unwitting consumers or the facilitation of a nonspeechrelated regulatory program. This is true of most food content regulations and
securities disclosures, among other things. Insofar as recent federal disclosure
requirements—such as a requirement for graphic warnings of the dangers of
smoking on cigarette packs184 or calorie labeling on menus185—raise constitutional
issues, it is under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, as each is clearly
based upon a substantial interest.
As mandatory labeling and disclosure requirements have become more
popular, policymakers have proposed a wider range of such policies. Some of these
raise more difficult constitutional questions, because it is unclear whether such
policies can be justified by a substantial state interest, independent of an alleged
consumer right to know. This Article now turns to consider three such examples: (1)
labels for products containing or derived from engineered organisms; (2) labels for
products containing nanomaterial; and (3) country-of-origin labels.
A. Genetically Modified Organism Labeling
Scientists have developed advanced techniques to genetically modify
plants and other organisms. Since the introduction of the first genetically engineered
food product in 1994, over 150 genetically engineered crops have been approved for
use in the United States, including numerous types of corn, alfalfa, soy, and
cotton.186 Many policymakers and activist organizations argue that consumers have
a right to know whether food products contain, or were manufactured with,
ingredients that were produced with these modern genetic engineering techniques. 187
184.
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
185.
See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
2009).
186.
See COUNCIL FOR AGRIC., SCI. & TECH, THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
MANDATORY LABELING FOR GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3
(2014); Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo et al., Genetically Engineered Crops in the United States,
ECON. RES. REP. NO. 162 (2014).
187.
See, e.g., Carey Gillam, Consumer Groups Demand GMO Labeling, Question
Food Safety, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-foodidUSBRE82Q10820120327; Georgina Gustin, Push to Label Genetically Modified Food
Gains
Traction,
ST.
LOUIS
POST-DISP.
(Mar.
3,
2012),
http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/push-to-label-genetically-modified-food-gainstraction/article_397471e6-625a-11e1-a317-001a4bcf6878.html; Amy Harmon & Andrew
Pollack, Battle Brewing over Labeling of Genetically Modified Food, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2012, at A1; see also Hemphill & Banerjee, supra note 109, at 438; Noah, Genetic
Modification, supra note 137, at 767. For a sampling of organizations and groups calling for
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As of April 2014, over two dozen states had considered legislation to require
labeling of GMO or GMO-derived products. 188 While several state-level ballot
initiatives failed, 189 a few state legislatures have enacted mandatory labeling
requirements.190 Some of these requirements, however, are not due to take effect
unless other states enact equivalent measures. 191
There is a widespread scientific consensus that modern genetic
engineering, in itself, poses no distinct risk to human health.192 The U.S. National
Academy of Sciences, for instance, has repeatedly reaffirmed that genetic
engineering presents no unique or distinct hazards from traditional forms of
crossbreeding, or even from the introduction of unmodified organisms. 193 The
mandatory GMO labeling, see GE Food Labeling, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY,
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-food-labeling/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016);
Consumer
Labels,
FOOD
&
WATER
WATCH,
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/food/consumer-labels/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016)
(activist website urging viewers that consumers have a general right to know that they should
“protect”); JUST LABEL IT!, http://www.justlabelit.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (a project
of Organic Voices Action Fund); LABEL GMOS, www.labelgmos.org (last visited Feb. 21,
2016) (a California grassroots campaign that urges legislation to mandate labels on
genetically modified foods based on consumers’ right to know); VERMONT RIGHT TO KNOW
GMOS, http://www.vtrighttoknowgmos.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (Vermont campaign
in support of mandatory GMO labels).
188.
See COUNCIL FOR AGRIC., SCI. & TECH, supra note 186, at 3.
189.
See Andrew Pollack, After Loss, the Fight to Label Modified Food Continues,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at B4.
190.
See State Labeling Legislation Map, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY,
http://salsa3.salsalabs.com/o/1881/p/salsa/web/common/public/content?content_item_KEY
=13981 (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (listing states that have passed mandatory labeling
legislation).
191.
See Ariana Bunjung Cha, New Twist on the GMO Debate: ‘Are They
Natural?,’ WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2013, at A3.
192.
As the American Association for the Advancement of Science Board of
Directors stated:
The World Health Organization, the American Medical Association, the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the British Royal Society, and every
other respected organization that has examined the evidence has come to
the same conclusion: consuming foods containing ingredients derived
from [genetically modified] crops is no riskier than consuming the same
foods containing ingredients from crop plants modified by conventional
plant improvement techniques.
AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., STATEMENT BY THE AAAS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
ON LABELING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD (2012) [hereinafter AAAS STATEMENT],
http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/AAAS_GM_statement.pdf. The consensus also
extends to animal health. Id.
193.
See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING & ASSESSING UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS ON HUMAN HEALTH, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., SAFETY OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS: APPROACHES TO ASSESSING UNINTENDED HEALTH
EFFECTS (2004); COMM. ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS (2000); COMM. ON SCI.
EVALUATION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED MICROORGANISMS AND
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National Institutes of Health194 and American Medical Association195 have reached
the same conclusion. Decades of research have failed to identify any specific human
health risks posed by the use of modern genetic engineering techniques. For this
reason, the FDA does not view foods produced with genetically modified
ingredients to be materially different from foods containing ingredients produced
with conventional techniques.196
The broad scientific consensus that genetic engineering, in itself, does not
create any unique, or even identifiable, risk for human health means that a
mandatory label or disclosure requirement for the use of such techniques cannot be
justified on the grounds that it is protecting unwitting consumers from harm. If a
GMO ingredient poses a risk to consumers, it is not due to the genetic modification
technique. Rather, as the FDA has explained, any risk will be the result of the
specific modification made. 197 For this reason, the FDA focuses on the
characteristics of specific ingredients—such as the potential to cause an allergic
reaction or other effect—rather than on the means with which they were produced.
Given that the use of GMO ingredients, in itself, does not pose any health
risk to consumers, mandatory GMO labels could actually “mislead and falsely alarm
consumers,” according to the American Association for the Advancement of
Science.198 The existence of a label disclosing GMO content, in itself, suggests that

PLANTS INTO THE ENV’T, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 14 (1989) (“[N]o conceptual distinction exists
between genetic modification of plants and microorganisms by classical methods or by
molecular techniques that modify DNA and transfer genes.”); COMM. ON THE INTRODUCTION
OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE ENV’T, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS.,
INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA-ENGINEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT:
KEY ISSUES 6 (1987) (“There is no evidence that unique hazards exist either in the use of RDNA techniques or in the transfer of genes between unrelated organisms.”).
194.
See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 1992 NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY
BOARD REPORT 2 (1992) (“The risks associated with biotechnology are not unique, and tend
to be associated with particular products and their applications, not with the production
process or the technology per se.”).
195.
See COUNCIL ON SCI. & PUB. HEALTH, AM. MED. ASS’N, LABELING OF
BIOENGINEERED
FOODS
(2012),
http://factsaboutgmos.org/sites/default/files/AMA%20Report.pdf.
196.
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New
Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984, 22991 (May 29, 1992). For a legal challenge to this
policy statement that was rejected, see All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166
(D.D.C. 2000).
197.
The FDA provides the following example:
[I]f a tomato has had a peanut protein introduced into it and there is
insufficient information to demonstrate that the introduced protein could
not cause an allergic reaction in a susceptible population, a label
declaration would be required to alert consumers who are allergic to
peanuts so they could avoid that tomato.
Statement of Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22991.
198.
See AAAS STATEMENT, supra note 192.
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this is a product characteristic that consumers should care about. Consequently, such
labels are likely to “stigmatize” GMO-containing products.199
Even though the use of genetic modification techniques may not pose any
identifiable risks to human health, some consumers would prefer to purchase
products that were not developed with these technologies. In response, many
producers have sought to label their products in order to capitalize on this sentiment.
As discussed below, existing FDA rules might make the voluntary disclosure of such
information unduly difficult. Nonetheless, many producers have found ways to
inform consumers that they do not use GMO ingredients. Chipotle is one prominent
example of a company that aggressively promotes its refusal to use GMO
ingredients in its food.200 Consumers who wish to avoid GMOs may also do so by
purchasing products that are labeled as “organic.” Under the USDA’s current
regulations, only foods that are not made with GMO ingredients may be labeled as
organic. Therefore, organic labeling serves as a de facto nationally certified GMOfree label.201 Some companies are also considering the voluntary labeling of GMO
content. Campbell Soup, for example, announced in January 2016 that it would
begin to place GMO-content labels on its products.202
The first legal battle over GMO labeling involved dairy products. In 1994,
Vermont adopted a law mandating disclosure labels for milk and milk products
offered for retail sale if the product came from dairy cows that had been injected
with recombinant bovine somatotropin (“rBST” or “rBGH”). 203 Bovine
somatotropin (“BST”) is a naturally occurring growth hormone that affects the
amount of milk dairy cows produce. rBST is produced in a lab through recombinant
DNA techniques and increases milk production when injected into cows. According
to the FDA, the use of rBST affects the dairy cows, but has no effect on the chemical
composition of the milk produced, and raises no human health or safety concerns. 204
Use of rBST on dairy cows results in no measurable increase in milk BST levels,
although it does increase the incidence of mastitis in cows. The FDA even declared
that any suggestion that milk from non-rBST-treated cows is better for human
consumption would be “false and misleading.”205 Lacking any definitive scientific
basis for claiming the labeling law protected human health or safety, Vermont
justified its law on the grounds that the public had a right to know whether given
milk products had come from cows treated with rBST. The state argued that
199.
See Hemphill & Banerjee, supra note 109, at 443; Ellen & Bone, supra note
142, at 69; see also Noah, Genetic Modification, supra note 137, at 787.
200.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
201.
See Chen, supra note 168, at 217.
202.
See Stephanie Strom, Campbell Labels Will Disclose G.M.O. Ingredients,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2016, at B1. In the same announcement, Campbell announced that it
would also call for the nationwide imposition of a mandatory GMO-content label.
203.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2754 (1995) (“If rBST has been used in the production
of milk or a milk product for retail sale in this state, the retail milk or milk product shall be
labeled as such.”).
204.
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling
of Milk and Milk Products From Cows That Have Not Been Treated With Recombinant
Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279-04, 6279–80 (Feb. 10, 1994).
205.
Id. at 6280.
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Vermont consumers would benefit from knowing which milk products came from
cows treated with rBST and would alter their buying habits accordingly.
Dairy manufacturers successfully challenged Vermont’s labeling
requirement in federal court. 206 In International Dairy Foods Association v.
Amestoy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that Vermont’s
labeling requirement violated dairy manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.
Applying the Central Hudson analysis, the Court found that Vermont did not have
a substantial interest in compelling dairy manufacturers to adopt mandatory rBST
labels.207 Vermont cited no evidence that milk from rBST-treated cows posed any
risk to public health, and did not claim that health or safety concerns motivated
adoption of the labeling requirement. Indeed, as the court noted, it was “undisputed
that the dairy products derived from herds treated with rBST are indistinguishable
from products derived from untreated herds.” 208 Rather, Vermont adopted the
standard due to “strong consumer interest and the public’s ‘right to know.’” 209 This,
the court held, was insufficient.
The Second Circuit pointedly (and correctly) rejected the argument that
consumer interest or an alleged right to know about how a product was made
constituted a sufficiently substantial government interest to justify compelling
commercial speech. 210 In the court’s words, “consumer curiosity alone is not a
strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual
statement.” 211 While the court accepted that some consumers may wish to know
which milk products came from rBST-treated or rBST-free cows, in the absence of
some health or safety-related concern, this interest was not sufficient to impose a
requirement on producers.212
As the court noted, there is a virtually infinite array of characteristics about
any given product or the process through which it was made that may interest
consumers. Thus, if consumer interest alone were sufficient to authorize a labeling
requirement, the court observed, “there is no end to the information that states could
require manufacturers to disclose about their production methods.” 213 A consumer
interest standard would empower governments to force producers to stigmatize their
own products. Yet the court reported that it could find no case in which a federal
court had upheld a regulation “requiring a product’s manufacturers to publish the
functional equivalent of a warning about a production method that has no discernible
impact on a final product.”214 If the First Amendment freedom to speak includes a
“concomitant freedom not to speak publicly,”215 and if the Amendment’s protection
206.
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1995).
207.
Id. at 73–74.
208.
Id. at 69.
209.
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Vt. 1995).
210.
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 73 n.1 (“[M]ere consumer concern is
not, in itself, a substantial interest.”).
211.
Id. at 74.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
Id. at 73.
215.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
(quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
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extends to commercial speech, the court found that an undifferentiated consumer
interest would not be enough.
In 2014, Vermont enacted another GMO labeling law, leading to another
legal challenge.216 Vermont’s Act 120 requires the “clear and conspicuous” labeling
of all food intended for human consumption “produced entirely or in part from
genetic engineering.” 217 In enacting this requirement, the Vermont legislature
declared that such foods “potentially pose risks to health, safety, agriculture, and the
environment,” citing an alleged “lack of consensus regarding the validity of the
research and science surrounding the safety of genetically engineered foods.” For
this reason, the Vermont legislature declared, a mandatory label would provide
consumers with “information they can use to make decisions about what products
they would prefer to purchase” and would “prevent inadvertent consumer deception,
prevent potential risks to human health, protect religious practices, and protect the
environment.”218
One question this raises is whether the mere assertion of a substantial state
interest, without meaningful support from the relevant scientific research or
administrative bodies, should be enough to satisfy Central Hudson. While this
precise question is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that under any
form of heightened scrutiny, it is not sufficient for the government to merely assert
an interest, and courts will generally scrutinize the alleged basis for such an interest
if it is challenged.
B. Nanotechnology Labeling
Genetic modification is not the only new technology to prompt calls for
mandatory labels. Some analysts and activist groups have also called for the
adoption of mandatory labels for products containing nanoscale particles (or
“nanoparticles”), nanomaterials, or other forms of nanotechnology. 219
“Nanotechnology” generally refers to processes and products that contain materials
that are 100 nanometers (nm) or smaller. 220 For reference, there are one billion

216.
See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015).
217.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 3043 (2016).
218.
See 2014 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 120 (codified as amended VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9 § 3041 (2016)).
219.
See, e.g., Developments in Nanotechnology, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Sci. & Tech., 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (Statement of J. Clarence Davies, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.); JENNIFER SASS, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, NANOTECHNOLOGY’S INVISIBLE THREAT: SMALL SCIENCE, BIG CONSEQUENCES 9
(2007), http://www.nrdc.org/health/science/nano/nano.pdf; Andre Nel et al., Toxic Potential
of Materials at the Nanolevel, 311 Sᴄɪ. 622, 622 (2006).
220.
See generally Nan’o·tech·nol’o·gy n., 1 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 8–10
(2006). A more formal definition of nanotechnology is “the design characterization,
production and application of structures, devices and systems by controlled manipulation of
size and shape at the nanometer scale . . . that produces structures, devices and systems with
at least one novel or superior characteristic or property.” See Kimberly A. Gray, Five Myths
about Nanotechnology in the Current Public Policy Debate: A Science and Engineering
Perspective, in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS FOR
UNCERTAIN RISKS 22–23 (David A. Dana ed., 2012).
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nanometers in a meter. “Nanomaterials” are materials with at least one dimension
that is less than 100 nm, and “nanoparticles” have at least two dimensions that are
100 nm or smaller.221 Nanotechnology is currently used in a range of applications
from cosmetics and cleaning products to computer chips and medical procedures.
Calls for nanotechnology content labels are based upon concerns that
nanoscale materials may pose unique or distinct risks to human health and the
environment. 222 Such concerns are based upon evidence that extremely small
particles often exhibit distinct characteristics from their larger counterparts. 223 For
example, substances that are typically inert may exhibit highly reactive properties at
the nanoscale. These differences make nanotechnology a powerful tool but can also
be the source of unique and unanticipated risks. 224 In some cases, the inclusion of
nanomaterials may have health or safety consequences. 225 Thus, what makes
nanotechnology useful is also what could make it dangerous.
If mandatory labels for GMO content are constitutionally problematic, as
discussed above, does this mean that a nanotechnology labeling requirement would
be similarly suspect? Not necessarily. The primary argument against a generic
“contains GMOs” label is that, in the absence of evidence of a potential health risk
from the use of GMOs, the government lacks a substantial interest in compelling
disclosure. As the Second Circuit concluded in Amestoy, it is hard to justify such a
label without a public-health or safety justification.226

221.
See Gray, supra note 220, at 15.
222.
For an extended discussion of the relevant legal and policy considerations for
the labeling of products produced with or containing nanotechnology, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Labeling the Little Things, in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS 203–44 (David A. Dana ed., 2012).
223.
See Gray, supra note 220, at 46 (noting that nanoscale materials “develop
entirely new properties and behave uniquely relative to the same atoms packaged as bulk
materials”).
224.
See Albert C. Lin, Size Matters; Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 358 (2007) (observing that what makes nanomaterials useful and
attractive to manufacturers—“their small size, chemical composition, surface structure,
solubility, shape, and aggregative tendencies”—may also make them more dangerous).
225.
See Guidance for Industry: Safety of Nanomaterials in Cosmetic Products,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/guidanceregulation/guidancedocuments/ucm300886.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2016) (“The application of nanotechnology may result in product attributes
that differ from those of conventionally-manufactured products, and thus may merit particular
examination.”); Investigation of Potential Toxic Effects of Engineered Nanoparticles and
Biologic Microparticles in Blood and Their Biomarker Applications, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/scienceresearch/
biologicsresearchareas/ucm127045.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (“Several studies,
however, are raising safety concerns by showing toxic effects of fullerenes and CNTs.
Therefore, one part of our research is focused on determining the mechanism of toxicity in
these studies, by evaluating whether these nanomaterials are toxic to blood vessels and blood
cells.”).
226.
See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 n.6 (2001) (noting
the Amestoy decision “was expressly limited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement
is supported by no interest other than the gratification of ‘consumer curiosity’”).
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Whereas the FDA has concluded that milk from rBST-treated cows was no
different from other milk, products containing nanoscale materials are physically
different from other products. Although nanosilver and silver are both made from
silver atoms, they are not the same.227 Whereas the treatment of cows with rBST or
the use of GMO wheat in a loaf of bread may not have any effect on the unwitting
consumer, the inclusion of nanomaterials could change the properties of a product
and the risks it presents. Put another way, although there is little evidence that the
inclusion of GMOs has any effect on the safety of the resulting product, the same
cannot be said of nanomaterials. In some cases there is evidence that nanomaterials
could pose direct health or safety risks. 228 In others, there is no way to know—at
least not yet. Either way, there are reasons to suspect that the use of nanomaterials
could, in itself, pose different risks to consumers than the use of conventional
materials, and such concerns could provide the basis for a substantial governmental
interest in informing consumers about those potential risks.
Where there is scientific evidence that the inclusion of nanoscale materials
could pose a health or safety risk, it should be relatively easy to impose a product or
material-specific labeling requirement without raising First Amendment problems.
Such labels would differ little from the myriad labels that already exist concerning
potential allergens or other product contents that might harm the uninformed
consumer. There is nothing special about a new technology that shields it from
government disclosure requirements if the government can identify some health risk
or other substantial interest in compelling disclosure.
This does not mean that any and all potential nanomaterial content labels
would be constitutional. A requirement that manufacturers disclose specific types of
nanoparticles believed to pose a potential risk would be easier to defend than a
generic “contains nanoscale particles” label applied across a wide range of products,
without regard for the types of nanomaterial content. 229 Where health and safety
risks are hypothesized, but not demonstrated, a labeling rule might be more
vulnerable to challenge, but still supportable given evidence that the presence of
nanomaterials can itself be the source of risks or consequences to which consumers
were not previously exposed. Such a “precautionary” approach to disclosure—
requiring disclosure on the basis of potential but unverified risks—may be justified
where there is scientific evidence that certain types of risks could be anticipated,
even if they have yet to be established. The use of nanomaterials in consumer
products would seem to present such a case.

227.
See Swiss Fed. Labs. for Materials Sci. & Tech. (EMPA), Nanosilver: A New
Name
–
Well-Known
Effects,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Jan.
31,
2011),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/01/110131133005.htm (“Because of their
minute size[,] nanoparticles have different properties than those of larger particles of the same
material.”).
228.
See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
Nanotechnology: Health Effects and Workplace Assessments and Controls,
http://www.osha.gov/dsg/nanotechnology/nanotech_healtheffects.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2016).
229.
See Lin, supra note 224, at 395; see also Adler, supra note 222, at 207.
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C. Country-of-Origin Labeling
For over a century, the federal government has imposed country-of-origin
labeling (“COOL”) requirements on various imported products. These are among
the oldest disclosure requirements in federal law. Some states also impose COOL
requirements of their own. 230 As COOL requirements have become more stringent,
costly, and explicit, however, they have provoked legal challenges. In American
Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, split on the constitutionality of COOL requirements
for meat.231 Although the en banc court upheld the rules against a First Amendment
challenge, the judges split on the rationale, and two judges dissented. 232
The first COOL requirements date from the 1890s.233 Originally imposed
in the Tariff Acts of 1890, 1894, and 1897, COOL requirements were adopted as
part of the nation’s customs and tariff laws. 234 Identifying a given product’s country
of origin helped ensure that it was subject to the proper tariffs or preferential
treatment when imported. COOL requirements also helped reinforce the federal
government’s preference for domestically produced products. 235 By identifying the
source country of imported products, COOL could encourage consumers to
purchase domestic alternatives. The purpose of such requirements was “to mark the
good so that, at the time of purchase, the ultimate purchaser may, by knowing where
the goods were produced, be able to buy or refuse to buy them, if such marking
should influence his will.”236
Although one purpose of COOL requirements was to influence consumer
behavior, they did not always require that all products bear country-of-origin
230.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-780, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN
LABELING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR USDA AND INDUSTRY TO IMPLEMENT CHALLENGING ASPECTS
OF THE NEW LAW 44 (2003).
231.
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
aff’d en banc 760 F.3d. 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
232.
Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 35–54. Judge Kavanaugh concurred in the
judgment. Judges Henderson and Brown dissented. Subsequent to this decision, a World
Trade Organization compliance panel ruled that the COOL requirements were discriminatory.
See Appellate Body Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL)
Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/RW, WT/DS386/RW (adopted May 18, 2015); Panel
Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements, WTO
Doc. WT/DS384/RW, WT/DS386/RW (adopted Oct. 20, 2014); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.
v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 520 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting WTO ruling and potential sanctions).
In response, Congress revised the relevant statutory requirements and the COOL requirements
for beef, and pork cuts were removed. See Removal of Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling
Requirements for Beef and Pork Muscle Cuts, Ground Beef, and Ground Pork, 81 Fed. Reg.
10755 (Mar. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 65).
233.
Peter Chang, Country of Origin Labeling: History and Public Choice Theory,
64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 693, 693–94 (2009).
234.
Id. at 694–95.
235.
See Chang, supra note 233, at 695 (“COOL, at least in its historical form (and
perhaps even today), is better understood as one in an array of disparate treatment measures
carried out by the U.S. government.”).
236.
Id. at 697 (quoting United States v. Friedlaender & Co, Inc., 27 C.C.P.A. 297,
302 (C.C.P.A. 1940)).

2016]

CONSUMER "RIGHT TO KNOW"

467

information at the point of sale. Rather, they required that such markings be placed
upon the containers in which goods were imported.237 The early COOL laws also
gave the Secretary of the Treasury wide discretion to exempt products from the
requirements.238
In the 1970s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) began to
impose COOL requirements on imported meat and poultry. 239 Just as early COOL
requirements were integrated into tariff laws, they were also integrated into
regulations governing food safety requirements and helped ensure that imported
meat and poultry satisfied relevant federal laws. They only applied to meat and
poultry products as imported. That is, meat or poultry imported into the United
States and subsequently processed before retail sale would not have to bear a label
specifying country-of-origin.240 Consequently, these COOL requirements facilitated
the enforcement of other federal regulations and played “a relatively minor role in
the delivery of information to the consumer.”241
Domestic meat producers pushed for more stringent COOL requirements
in response to an increase in meat imports in the 1980s and 1990s. 242 Interestingly,
the USDA was cool to the proposed COOL requirements. 243 Nonetheless, such
requirements were enacted as part of the 2002 Farm Bill and Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008. Unlike the trade law COOL requirements, the provisions
adopted in 2008 applied to retailers of covered commodities—including meat, fish,
peanuts, and produce—and required COOL “at the final point of sale . . . to
consumers.”244 Whereas the trade law COOL requirements arguably facilitated the
enforcement and implementation of trade regulations and tariffs, including countryof-origin requirements, the USDA COOL requirements were focused on informing
consumers of the countries from which their foods were imported.
One provision of the 2008 COOL statute obligated retailers to provide
consumers with country-of-origin information for meat based upon where the
animal was born, raised, and slaughtered.245 USDA regulations implementing this
provision promulgated in 2013 required retailers to specify the country-of-origin for
each step in production.246 That is, point-of-sale disclosures would have to identify
the country or countries in which the meat in question was born, raised, and
237.
This is still the case. See 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
238.
See Chang, supra note 233, at 697.
239.
See 9 C.F.R. § 327.14 (1970).
240.
Chang, supra note 233, at 699.
241.
Id. (“COOL in an inspection regime thus implicates a considerably different
purpose than in a consumer-oriented regime.”).
242.
Id. at 699–700.
243.
Id. at 700. (explaining that the USDA raised concerns about the cost to
implement, comply with, and enforce the requirements).
244.
7 U.S.C. § 1638 (2012).
245.
Id. § 1638a.
246.
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 78 Fed. Reg.
31,367-01 (May 24, 2013). These regulations were adopted, in part, as a response to a World
Trade Organization Appellate Body ruling against prior regulations adopted by USDA to
implement the 2008 Act. See APPELLATE BODY REPORT, WORLD TRADE ORG., UNITED
STATES—CERTAIN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING (COOL) REQUIREMENTS (June 29, 2012).
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slaughtered. 247 Meat processors objected to the rule, raising First Amendment
objections. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately rejected their
claims 248 (although the requirements were subsequently lifted after they were
challenged before the World Trade Organization). 249
Insofar as the USDA COOL requirements were intended to merely inform
otherwise unaware consumers about the geographic origin of meat products, and
perhaps stigmatize those products from foreign countries, they might seem to face
First Amendment problems. Yet, given the history of COOL requirements of one
sort or another, it might seem odd if such labels failed to survive First Amendment
scrutiny. 250 As with many other proposed labeling or disclosure requirements,
COOL must serve a substantial state interest. The question is whether they serve an
interest beyond an asserted consumer right to know. If the only purpose of a COOL
requirement is to satisfy consumer curiosity or inform consumers that might
otherwise have had little concern about the national origin of meat products, it
should face constitutional difficulty.
In challenging the constitutionality of the COOL requirements, the
American Meat Institute charged that there was no basis for such requirements other
than satisfying “consumers’ idle curiosity” or, worse, stigmatizing foreign meat
products. 251 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc,
disagreed, concluding that “several aspects of the government’s interest in countryof-origin-labeling for food combine to make the interest substantial,” including the
“context and long history of country-of-origin disclosures,” “demonstrated
consumer interest in such labels for food products,” and “the individual health
concerns and market impacts that can arise in the event of a food-borne illness
outbreak.”252
Reliance upon purported consumer interest in knowing about the country
of origin of given products, without more, would be insufficient to justify such
labels. Members of Congress appealed to this interest in urging the imposition of
COOL requirements so that consumers could make “informed choices.” 253 Yet as
discussed above, such a claim can be made about any potential labeling or disclosure

247.
One consequence of this rule is that it effectively required meat packers to
make changes to some production processes, such as “commingling” in which some meat
products, such as ground beef, could contain meat from multiple animals that may have come
from more than one country. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065,
1068–70 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The added costs resulting from this requirement are likely what
caused the American Meat Institute, which represents meat processors, to file suit against the
rule. As of 2015, the American Meat Institute is now the “North American Meat Institute.”
See North American Meat Institute, NAMI, http://www.meatinstitute.org (last visited Mar. 4,
2016).
248.
See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27.
249.
See infra note 233.
250.
See id. at 30 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that for
many, the question whether COOL requirements are permissible “probably answers itself”).
251.
Id. at 23.
252.
Id.
253.
Id. at 24.
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requirement.254 For its part, the USDA vacillated on its justification and, perhaps
tellingly, never claimed that there was a market failure preventing the disclosure of
country-of-origin information sought by consumers. 255 As some products would not
be labeled absent the federal mandate, this is likely because there is little evidence
that consumers are particularly interested in such information, and little evidence
that COOL labeling has a significant effect on consumer behavior. 256
Of those interests identified by the en banc D.C. Circuit, the “historical
pedigree” of COOL requirements would seem to be the most significant, particularly
given the longstanding use of such requirements as a component of trade policy. 257
As the Supreme Court has held, “a universal and long-established tradition” of
imposing particular requirements may create “a strong presumption” that such
measures are constitutional, even under the First Amendment.258 If the Court has
been willing to cite such a presumption to justify restrictions subject to strict
scrutiny, it would seem to satisfy the lesser scrutiny of Central Hudson. Still,
tradition and longstanding government practice are generally not enough, by
themselves, to justify restrictions upon speech.
Insofar as a COOL requirement facilitates the implementation and
enforcement of relevant trade rules and restrictions—and is thus “fundamentally
economic policy”259—it would seem they readily satisfy Central Hudson. As noted
earlier, the Supreme Court upheld compelled contributions to an agricultural
promotion program in Glickman because the requirement was part of a larger
regulatory scheme that had purposes beyond the regulation or control of commercial
speech.260 Facilitating a regulatory program in this way is a substantial interest under
254.
See supra Part IV; see also Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 31–32 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is plainly not enough for the Government to say simply that it has a
substantial interest in giving consumers information. After all, that would be true of any and
all disclosure requirements.”).
255.
As observers noted, the USDA had quite a difficult time identifying the precise
interests that would justify the COOL requirements. See Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story:
Country of Origin Labeling and the First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 35 (2015)
[hereinafter Tushnet, COOL Story] (“[T]he government’s litigation position was so contorted
as to be unbelievable.”).
256.
See Mykel R. Taylor & Glynn T. Tonsor, Revealed Demand for Country-ofOrigin Labeling of Meat in the United States, 38 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 235, 245 (2013); see
also Tushnet, COOL Story, supra note 255, at 33 (“[T]he evidence that mandatory cool affects
purchasees is not strong.”).
257.
See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 24 (noting “the ‘time-tested consensus’ that
consumers want to know the geographical origin of potential purchases”); Tushnet, COOL
Story, supra note 255, at 25 (“COOL mandates’ extensive historical pedigree, dating back to
1890, took them out of the ‘idle curiosity’ category.”). In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied upon Burson v. Freeman, in which a divided Supreme Court held that “long history, a
substantial consensus, and simple common sense” were sufficient interests to justify a ban on
electioneering near polling places. 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
258.
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785 (2002); see also
Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
259.
See Tushnet, COOL Story, supra note 255, at 25 (“Mandatory COOL is
fundamentally economic policy.”).
260.
See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997)
(upholding compelled assessments on fruit tree growers to support advertising as part of
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Central Hudson. This is likely the case even if the purpose of the requirement is to
discourage the purchase of foreign goods solely because they are foreign. While the
economic case against trade restrictions or protectionist measures may be quite
strong as an economic matter, the federal government has near-plenary authority to
restrict the importation of goods from overseas and it has long been recognized that
the federal government has an interest in supporting and protecting domestic
industry.261

VII. ALTERNATIVES TO COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Subjecting governmental requirements that producers and sellers disclose
information about their products and services to the intermediate scrutiny of Central
Hudson is unlikely to prevent agencies and regulators from safeguarding public
health or market efficiency. Central Hudson merely requires that compelled
commercial speech be justified by a substantial government interest. Protecting
unwitting consumers from potential harm and curing potentially misleading speech
both satisfy this requirement. Moreover, as discussed above, dynamic markets do a
very good (although admittedly not perfect) job at encouraging the disclosure of
information that consumers consider to be relevant to their purchasing decisions. 262
Even if one takes a less sanguine view of market dynamics than that presented in
Part V, governments retain ample means to ensure that consumers obtain adequate
information about the products and services they buy and are protected from fraud
and unscrupulous corporate behavior.
Insofar as policymakers are concerned that given markets do not generate
sufficient disclosure or adequately highlight relevant characteristics about products
and services, there are steps, short of compelling commercial speech, that can be
taken to address such concerns. First, policymakers can identify and eliminate
existing market interventions that hamper the free flow of relevant information in
product and service markets; they can seek to have government “first, do no
harm.”263 Second, as already noted, government agencies can promulgate regulatory
definitions of vague or ambiguous terms so as to reduce consumer confusion and
prevent potentially misleading product claims. Third, if these first two steps are
insufficient, the government retains the ability to engage in government speech to
inform consumers about relevant product and service characteristics, and to
encourage or influence consumer behavior. Each of these is discussed briefly.

larger regulatory marketing scheme); cf. United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2000)
(invalidating compelled assessments imposed independent of broader regulatory scheme).
261.
Put another way, free trade may be good policy, but it is not constitutionally
required. Or, to paraphrase Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Sorrell, the Founders enacted a First
Amendment—they did not enact Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. See Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (“The Constitution ‘does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
Social Statics.’. . . It does enact the First Amendment.”) (citation omitted).
262.
See supra Part VI.
263.
HIPPOCRATES, THE HISTORY OF EPIDEMICS IN SEVEN BOOKS 10 (Samuel Farr
trans., 1780).
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A. First Do No Harm
In many contexts, the government’s best first step is to remove or reduce
barriers to greater private provision of information within the marketplace. Not all
information is equally valuable and one of the most important questions to answer
is which information is most important to which consumers. A relatively free and
unobstructed marketplace facilitates the discovery of this knowledge and
encourages producers to respond to concerns. Restraints on information disclosure,
on the other hand, inhibit competition, in addition to limiting consumer choice. 264
When various government agencies discourage firms from making process-related
or other normative claims about their products, it may inhibit welfare-maximizing
disclosures. The same principles that constrain the imposition of mandatory product
labels also limit government restrictions on voluntary labeling efforts.
This point is illustrated by International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs
in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down state
regulations that inhibited the ability of dairy processors to distinguish their products
from those of their competitors through voluntary disclosures.265 In Boggs, the Sixth
Circuit struck down regulations adopted by the state of Ohio barring dairy
processors from labeling milk as “rbST-Free,” but upheld the state’s ability to
require disclaimers for some rbST-related product claims designed to prevent
consumer confusion, subject to First Amendment constraints.266 Although the FDA
does not believe there is any material difference between milk produced from cows
treated with rbST and that from nontreated cows, 267 some producers and consumers
are not convinced. Whether due to precautionary concerns about the potential of asyet-undetected risks or other reasons, such as a concern for animal welfare, 268 some
consumers prefer to purchase milk produced by cows that are not treated with
rbST. 269 In response, some producers (including members of the Organic Trade
Association) sought to label their milk products as “rbST-free” or to otherwise
indicate that their milk did not come from rbST-treated cows.270
Conventional dairy producers were not enamored with the new “rbST-free”
labels. Consequently, the Ohio Department of Agriculture adopted rules governing
the voluntary labeling of milk products. These rules barred the use of “rbST-free”
or equivalent composition claims on milk labels. In addition, the rules required that
any production claims about milk, such as “this milk is from cows not treated with
rbST,” be accompanied with a prominent disclaimer noting that the FDA has
determined that there is no significant difference between milk from cows

264.
See Beales et al., supra note 106, at 514.
265.
622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010).
266.
Id. at 650.
267.
See supra notes 201–02.
268.
There is a higher rate of infection in cows treated with rbST due to the
increased milk production resulting from such treatment. See Recombinant Bovine Growth
Hormone,
AM.
CANCER
SOC’Y,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/
othercarcinogens/athome/recombinant-bovine-growth-hormone (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
269.
In some cases, this preference may be based on concerns for animal welfare.
See id.
270.
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 622 F.3d at 633.
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administered rbST and those that were not.271 The rules were influenced by, and
largely followed, the 1994 FDA guidance on milk labeling. 272
The state defended its rules as reasonable measures to prevent false and
misleading product claims about milk. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, concluding the
ban on rbST-related composition claims was more extensive than necessary to serve
the state’s interest in preventing false or misleading speech. 273 The court concluded
that there was a sufficient difference in milk from rbST-treated and nontreated cows
to reject the state’s claim that an “rbST-free” label is inherently misleading, and held
that any potential consumer confusion could be alleviated by accompanying the
claim with an appropriate disclaimer. 274 In short, any problem with the label was
better cured with additional speech than with a limitation on speech. The court also
concluded that the mandatory disclaimer for production claims was reasonably
related to the state’s interest in preventing false or misleading claims, but that some
of the specific requirements—e.g., that the disclaimer appear in the same label
panel—were more extensive than necessary.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision is entirely consistent with Amestoy and the
analysis here.275 Both Boggs and Amestoy affirm that product labels receive First
Amendment protection, and that the state’s ability to control the content of such
labels is limited. Consumers may or may not prefer milk from cows that were
administered rbST, and producers should be free to use their labels to identify their
products as potentially desirable to consumers with particular preferences, but
should not be forced to do so without a more compelling justification than simple
consumer preference. The government’s role is to ensure that whatever information
is disclosed is truthful and not misleading, not to mandate disclosure of product
characteristics important to some consumers but not others.
Boggs also illustrates that labeling mandates are not always necessary for
consumers to obtain desired information about how given food products are
produced. Just because a government agency does not mandate disclosure of a
particular fact—such as whether milk came from rbST-treated cows or a fish filet
came from an AquAdvantage salmon—does not mean the information will not be
disclosed. In a competitive market, producers have every incentive to differentiate
their products in accordance with consumer preferences. And insofar as some
consumers prefer a particular type of milk or salmon, producers of products with the
relevant characteristics will inform consumers of these facts. So long as the failure
to disclose a product characteristic will not cause harm to the uninformed consumer,
the government should stay its hand.

271.
Id. at 634.
272.
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling
of Milk and Milk Products From Cows That Have Not Been Treated With Recombinant
Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 28 (Feb. 10, 1994), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR1994-02-10/html/94-3214.htm.
273.
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 622 F.3d at 639–40.
274.
Id. at 639.
275.
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
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B. Government Standards
Limiting the government’s ability to compel the disclosure of factually true
information about products and services does not bar the government from setting
standards or otherwise intervening in the commercial marketplace to ensure that
consumers understand the content of marketplace messages. One way for the
government to do this is to issue rules clarifying the meaning of potentially vague
or ambiguous terms that may be used to describe products. 276 Providing clear, fixed
standards for potentially contested terms makes it easier for consumers to understand
what is, and is not, being communicated by product labels and commercial
disclosures, thereby reducing the likelihood that consumers are misled or
deceived.277
Federal agencies have already promulgated regulations defining what it
means for a product to contain or be “free” of particular ingredients, or what it means
for something to be “fresh,” as opposed to frozen.278 The government can also set
standards for voluntary labels or disclosures, as the government has with organic
labeling.279 Voluntary standards enable consumers to be sure that products that have
particular marks or disclosures meet a given standard, but do not compel speech or
otherwise raise First Amendment concerns. In such instances, the government is not
compelling speech. Rather, it is ensuring that commercial speech about applicable
products and services is not misleading.
In any given context, there may be substantial room to debate whether it is
advisable to adopt a set of rules clarifying and defining the meaning of specific terms
or phrases as a policy matter. One potential downside of adopting clarifying rules is
that such requirements could lock a definition in place, and discourage more
dynamic competition in regard to the relevant product characteristics. Some have
raised concerns that this has been the result of federal standards for “organic” foods,
which were set at a level stringent enough to satisfy some producers, but not others,
and constrained the broader environmental and ethical debate about how food should
or should not be produced.280 So long as any government regulatory standard leaves
ample room for firms to identify their products and communicate with consumers,
such regulations should not raise serious First Amendment concerns.

276.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text; see also Tushnet, It Depends,
supra note 94, at 238–48 (discussing government standard setting for the use of terms and
labels).
277.
See Tushnet, It Depends, supra note 94, at 249; see also Justin Hughes,
Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate about Geographical Indications,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 336–37 (2006).
278.
See, e.g., FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., Meat and
Poultry Labeling Terms, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safetyeducation/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/food-labeling/meat-and-poultry-labelingterms/meat-and-poultry-labeling-terms (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
279.
See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text.
280.
See Friedland, supra note 180.
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C. Government Speech
Though the First Amendment precludes basing mandatory labeling
requirements on consumer curiosity or the desire of a particular interest group to
force disclosure about product or process characteristics, it does not preclude all
government efforts to facilitate the disclosure of information that consumers may
find valuable or interesting. As the Court noted in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., if the
state disagrees with the messages or conduct of private firms, “the State can express
that view through its own speech.”281 The government must be able to point to a
substantial state interest before compelling commercial speech—and may need to
identify an even greater interest before compelling speech on some moral or political
questions—but the government does not face the same burden when requiring
producers or sellers to disclose information to the government as part of an otherwise
acceptable regulatory program.
The burden of being forced to tell consumers how a product was made at
the point of sale is wholly different than that of providing the government with
general information about production processes, safety measures, environmental
impacts, and the like. The latter disclosures do not implicate the same First
Amendment interests, because they do not infringe upon a producer’s ability to
define its own message or reorient the flow of information concurrent with an
economic transaction. Government disclosure of this same information, such as on
a government website, is government speech, and is similarly not subject to
equivalent constitutional constraints.282
The Supreme Court has made explicitly clear that the government may give
voice to messages and communicate information when the government could not
compel private parties to carry the same message. The First Amendment is not
implicated where “the government sets the overall message to be communicated and
approves every word that is disseminated,” even if the costs of such speech are
disproportionately borne by particular groups. 283 While, under United Foods,
producers may have a First Amendment right against being compelled to fund a
private commercial message with which they disagree, under Johanns they have no
such right against being required to fund the government’s dissemination of the
same message.284 Under Johanns, there is no “First Amendment right not to fund
government speech.”285
Because governments may require companies to report information to
regulatory agencies and because the disclosure of such information by the
government does not implicate protected First Amendment interests, informational
281.
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).
282.
Government disclosure of information collected pursuant to the
implementation of various regulatory programs may implicate other interests, such as the
protection of intellectual property. To the extent such interests are implicated, they raise
different questions than compelling commercial speech.
283.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
284.
Id. at 550; see also Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns
v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 200 [hereinafter Post,
Compelled Subsidization].
285.
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
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programs such as the Toxics Release Inventory do not raise First Amendment
concerns. Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,286
companies are required to report on the release or transfer of certain chemicals to
government officials. This information is compiled by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and made available to the public in an online database. 287
Information-disclosure programs can serve many of the same purposes as labeling
or other programs, without compelling commercial speech. The public disclosure of
this information provides information to consumers and local communities and
gives companies an incentive to reduce their use and release of covered chemicals
so that they have less to report.288 Yet the information is disclosed to the public by
the government. Individual companies are not required to incorporate these
disclosures into their communications with their customers.
Potentially difficult First Amendment issues are raised, however, if the
government seeks to make a private party carry the government’s message, such as
through a government-mandated label. Requiring a private company to use its
product as a de facto “billboard” for the government’s message may not constitute
compelled commercial speech, but it does implicate First Amendment interests. 289
The motto on a license plate may be government speech—the license plate belongs
to the state, and not the owner of the vehicle—but the Supreme Court nonetheless
found that the First Amendment protected a car owner’s desire to cover over the
state’s message. 290 For this reason, declaring mandatory labels to be government
speech, and not the compelled commercial speech of the producer or seller, does not
eliminate First Amendment concerns.291

286.
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012).
287.
See Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Resources, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/index.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
288.
Whether a reduction in “releases” as defined for purposes of TRI improves
protection of public health or the environment is a separate question. As the EPA notes,
release data is not the same as exposure data. The volume of substances released does not
necessarily correlate with the magnitude of risk to the public. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN USING TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY DATA (2015),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/factors_to_consider_
6.15.15_final.pdf.
289.
See Post, Compelled Subsidization, supra note 284, at 209–10.
290.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
291.
Insofar as disclosure labels are characterized as government speech, they could
raise interesting takings issues as well. There is only a limited amount of space on a product
package, and requiring the package to carry the government’s message, in a particular format
covering a specified amount of space, could be seen as a taking of private property subject to
the Fifth Amendment, as the government warning would physically occupy a portion of the
product package or label. This would certainly be the case if the government required a private
landowner to erect a billboard displaying a government-dictated message. It is not
immediately clear why the same principle would not also apply to a product package. Cf.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982) (holding that the
placement of crossover cable wires on five-story apartment building constitutes a “taking”).
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CONCLUSION
Consumers may want to know all sorts of things about how products are
made, or who made them, but we typically let the market provide such information.
Some consumers care about whether their clothes were made by unionized workers
or poor children in developing nations. Some want to know whether their food is
organic, kosher, or produced humanely. Still others may care whether a company’s
executives support particular politicians or specific policies. 292 In all such cases, so
long as there is no material difference in the product that could adversely affect the
consumer, we leave the disclosure to the private marketplace.
Protecting compelled commercial speech as commercial speech under
Central Hudson does not pose a threat to the free flow of information in the
marketplace. To the contrary, constraining undue government interference in the
marketplace ensures the broadest space for the discovery and disclosure of
information that consumers are most concerned about, while also ensuring that the
government retains the ability to protect consumers from unscrupulous producers
and sellers.
The analysis contained here has focused on the threshold question of what
may justify government policies that compel commercial speech. Other questions
remain, including determining when particular disclosures are unduly burdensome
or disproportionate to the government’s interest, as well as determining the precise
contours of commercial speech, as opposed to political speech or professional
speech—the latter of which may be subject to extensive government regulation. 293
These questions, and many others, have been highlighted by recent controversies
over “conflict mineral” disclosures 294 and compelled speech in the context of
abortion and family-planning services. 295 Ensuring that compelled commercial
speech does not escape meaningful constitutional scrutiny reduces the risk that
government may seek to evade First Amendment protections through clever
categorization of communicative messages.
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See, e.g., Kevin Sack, A Whole Foods Squabble, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2009),
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care reform); Stephen Moore, Commentary, The Conscience of a Capitalist, Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛ. J. (Oct.
3,
2009,
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Foods CEO John Mackey responds to backlash over his op-ed about the Affordable Care
Act).
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